> Nobody would cheat then.
Depends. Perhaps somebody would try to bully (i.e. play a game of chicken http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)): "Either you lower your share in my favour, or I will claim too much and you get nothing."
It wouldn't work if it was explicitly known. The others could just as easily decide to cut him out of the distribution entirely.
Yes. Or if the victim could commit to not yielding to threats like this beforehand. Being able to commit oneself is of huge importance in games like chicken (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game)).
Re:Self-Enforcing Protocols
by silentOpen on Tuesday August 11, 2009 @02:48PM
(#755993)
Interesting idea but no parties in the protocol would be motivated to do that. This might be useful in a situation where a group entity exists that is approximately the same size as the division group -- e.g. an endowment, shared property, common business, or co-op.
In real life situations, you may want to replace the sea by the government or some kind of common fund in the domain.