This does carry the risk of inappropriately anthropomorphising non-human species, but as the question of whether other creatures feel pain is intimately linked to the morality of how humans should treat them (after all, we're not going to be able to stop other animals from inflicting pain on each other), then maybe it's not a problem.
If I use a cigarette lighter or a lit match to apply an open flame to one of this robot's thermistors, it will flinch away from the stimulus as fast as it can. This is closely analogous to "what we humans know to be a typical reaction to pain"; if you applied the same stimulus to one of my fingers, after all, I would initially react in much the same fashion.
From this behavioral observation, do you conclude that my robot's subjective experience a) exists at all, and b) encompasses the experience of pain? Does this behavioral observation inform your concept of the morality surrounding how this robot is treated by humans? Why, or why not?
(I eagerly invite speculation on what, on our notional silicaceous Earth-analog, might constitute a parallel to veganism.)
We can't measure "subjective experience", nor can we verify that it even exists; which suggests that it is not a well-defined concept and we shouldn't be using it for anything.