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Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by matthewmcg on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:04PM (#7532301)
I am still reading the book, but it seems like Lewis' main criticism in the book (vs. interviews) is against the so-called HFT front-running of orders that get routed to multiple exchanges. He is careful to distinguish market-making/liquidity providing functions from the multi-market latency arbitrage and spends a good part of Chapter 4 exploring this distinction.

Perhaps his public statements in interviews haven't been so nuanced.

Also, these rebuttals to the book don't really address the front-running issue. Is it simply an unavoidable consequence of the physical reality of separate markets? Should anything be done about it? Is it even still occurring or has competition among HFTs and savvier buy-side order routing eliminated it? I would like to read a rebuttal that discusses this.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tptacek on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:39PM (#7532580)
One of the more disingenuous things about Lewis' book (caveat: I'm only halfway through, because I'm listening to the audiobook and, on the advice of another reviewer, switched to the book _Dark Pools_ in midstream) is the rhetorical sleight of hand he plays with the term "front-running".

In Lewis' universe, the price movement that happens when an informed trader tries to piecemeal-fill a 100,000 share order is "front-running".

But in Larry Harris' universe†, not only is price movement during block shopping not "front-running", it is the fundamental reason for the existence of sell-side firms; in other words, the challenge of stealthily shopping 100,000 shares of thinly-traded product XYZ is the reason that Katsuyama made $2MM/yr.

Lewis posits that the natural state of affairs is that there's an NBBO for XYZ, and that Katsuyama should expect his equities desk to collect fat fees simply by accepting a block order from a client, pushing a button, and unloading it at the current best bid, whereupon at the completion of this order the price will change to reflect the altered supply/demand condition of XYZ.

But that is crazy. The presence of a 100,000 order changes the supply/demand conditions for XYZ. For RBC to expect to sell 100,000 shares at the current bid, it must expect to get something for nothing: to take the price hit for the increased demand of XYZ out of the hide of whoever is holding it right now.

Before HFT mania, "front-running" meant something very specific: it was a problem of agency. A client/broker relationship existed, and the broker exploited it by trading in front of their client's order. The client had a right to expect the broker to act in their best interests. But the markets as a whole aren't a positive-sum system; in the absence of a contractual relationship, nobody has an obligation to act in the interests of anyone else. A dollar you make on the market is a dollar someone else didn't make.

† https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7526783

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:45PM (#7532621)
The specific example given in the book is that an existing ask sized at 100,000 is already sitting on the order book when the buy order goes in at the ask price. The ask then disappears before the order executes. This is very different from the market moving in response to an order that has no market fill.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by harryh on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:47PM (#7532632)
The 100,000 shares are sitting on the order book at different exchanges. It's not a single block being traded with a single order. That's a critical distinction.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:00PM (#7532729)
I will refer you to page 96 of the book. The specific example is 100 shares of MSFT asking $30.00 and 10,000 shares asking $30.01. Because of Reg NMS, your broker is required to take down the 100 shares first ("NBBO"), allowing the HFTs to then start buying the $30.01 offer and front run the remainder of your bid. The problem with this requirement, according to Lewis, is the NBBO is priced off SIP rather than direct feeds. I don't disagree with the literal point that you are making, however, there is no need for this kind of intermediation. Why should natural traders pay intermediaries for this function? Why shouldn't they coordinate on an exchange where they don't face this tax?
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tptacek on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:11PM (#7532810)
RegNMS requires exchanges and trading centers to honor the Order Protection rule to route trades to the trading center with the best listed bid/ask price.

I don't think RegNMS requires a broker-dealer like RBC to route its order to any particular exchange.

Brokers already have a duty of best execution to their clients. They are allowed to use their judgement to send orders to any given exchange regardless of the NBBO. That's what enabled RBC to implement "Thor".

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:24PM (#7532901)
I'm not an expert but I believe you are incorrect. What you are suggesting is that the broker could perform a "trade-through", which was allowed under the old ITS rules. Under the Order Protection rule, trade-throughs of even 100 shares are explicitly prohibited. Reg NMS is very strict and that's why it is so controversial. My understanding of Thor is that it does not trade through, but it executes at all relevant exchanges near-simultaneously by delaying order routing to lower-latency exchanges. This prevents HFTs from sniffing your order at one exchange and beating you to the next.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tptacek on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:40PM (#7533003)
I too raise my "not an expert" flag and await corrections from 'yummyfajitas or 'kasey_junk.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by minimax on Friday April 04, 2014 @02:02PM (#7533170)
There are a number of possibilities depending on whether you send in a routable order (it's a flag you can set -- route or don't route, and there can be fees associated with routing). What a sophisticated trader would do is send two orders simultaneously taking out the small 100 lot at 30.01 and the 10,000 at 30. The exchange with the larger but worse price order will accept your order if you set the ISO flag, indicating you have sent orders to clear out better priced orders at any market centers displaying a better protected quote.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by theorique on Friday April 04, 2014 @02:26PM (#7533338)
That's correct. As long as the exchange to which the order is routed is presenting NBBO at the time the order is executed, then the broker is compliant with Reg NMS.

Also note, if that exchange is not offering NBBO, it is bound by Reg NMS to route onward to the actual venue that has NBBO. The exchanges are also bound by Reg NMS, not just broker dealers.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tptacek on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:54PM (#7532692)
If it were a single order in the book, I'm not sure I see the advantage HFTs would have conceptually had. They're not sniffing individual orders and then outrunning them before the original order hits the exchange; they're exploiting the individual piecemeal orders that are stealthily trying to move the block.

They're hunting down the orders of informed traders who are trying to exploit their own knowledge of the true price of products, and correcting the price on the market before those informed traders can take their knowledge out of everyone else's hide.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by kylebrown on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:24PM (#7532902)
The institutional orders get baited to BATS BYX with "taker rebates" (on BZX the fee structure is the normal maker-rebate taker-fee, but on BYX it is reversed). It hits BYX first because the broker's router is programmed to send it there first for that rebate, but its only for a minimal amount of shares. And that's a signal which the HFT firms use to pull or front-run equivalent offers on the various other exchanges.

The other big scam seems to be HFT firms buying a broker's order flow - for hundreds of millions of dollars. For example, Schwab sold its order flow to UBS for 8-year contract in 2005, for $285 million. It was massively underpriced, Schwab is said to have left a billion dollars on the table. And UBS, in turn, sold Schwab's order flow to Citadel for an undisclosed sum. Why is the right to execute a broker's order flow so valuable? Nobody seems to have a good answer, but the obvious reason is that its easy scalping.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by e40 on Friday April 04, 2014 @03:39PM (#7533803)
I see a lot of heat generated in this discussion, but I don't see an answer to your second paragraph. That's the answer I want to see.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by mmodahl on Friday April 04, 2014 @04:57PM (#7534326)
It is the easy scalping he mentioned.

A market maker can only stay in business if they sell as much as they buy and if the average sale price is above their average buy price. They lose money if they provide liquidity in the way of market moving forces.

Market makers try to avoid informed and "toxic" order flow and broker flow is guaranteed source of small uninformed orders that are most likely going to be crossing the spread.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by vasilipupkin on Friday April 04, 2014 @04:51PM (#7534286)
The answer is retail flow has no information - it's the ideal flow for professional market makers to trade against
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @05:47PM (#7534613)
While it's true that retail flow has no information, it's also true that a broker will obtain better executions if it does not sell order flow to HFTs.

http://www.elitetrader.com/vb/showthread.php?t=245029

https://institutions.interactivebrokers.com/en/index.php?f=1...

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by harryh on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:04PM (#7532759)
Yes exactly. A lot of people don't seem to understand this.
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by kcmarshall on Friday April 04, 2014 @05:28PM (#7534515)
Interesting side note: Here's a link to an Amazon review of _Dark Pools_. The review claims the name Brad Katsuyama and opens the review with "As an insider in the world of electronic trading..."

http://www.amazon.com/review/R2HRZNW5661QVR/ref=cm_cr_dp_tit...

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tptacek on Friday April 04, 2014 @05:37PM (#7534561)
I'm liking it a lot so far; it's written by an author who clearly thinks HFT is sinister, but who also seems to think the code behind it is really cool. (Maybe I'm biased, because that describes me pretty well too.)
Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by kasey_junk on Friday April 04, 2014 @06:25PM (#7534836)
I quite like Dark Pools even with the obvious bias. I will say that occasionally it gets technical aspects of things completely wrong, but that is pretty easy to do.

Also, as with any discussion about HFT look into the people who are making accusations against it. Most of the time they are ex execution traders made redundant by HFT or failed at HFT themselves.

Basically, I really enjoyed the history part of the book and found the expose part riddled with mistakes, obvious biases and vague terms that could be interpreted in many different ways.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by minimax on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:31PM (#7532536)
He is careful to distinguish market-making/liquidity providing functions from the multi-market latency arbitrage

I don't think the distinction is as clear as you think. If I'm making markets on several of the US equity exchanges, and I see my entire order on one side of the market at one exchange get taken, I will adjust my quotes at the other exchanges. That's not front running. It's a reasonable market making strategy.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:48PM (#7532639)
The argument from IEX is that the exchanges intentionally price trades using slower data than what they (the exchanges) have access to. We can call it whatever we want, but natural traders would prefer an exchange that doesn't price match in this way, and have every right to move to such an exchange.

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-03/bats-admits-ceo-lie...

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by kasey_junk on Friday April 04, 2014 @12:57PM (#7532710)
Natural large volume traders prefer an exchange that doesn't price match this way. No one is preventing them from creating a dark pool (which is what IEX is) and they already have any number of dark pools available for this sort of trading.

Turns out many natural traders (Vanguard is the one that comes first to mind). Really like trading in the new HFT world as it is way cheaper than it used to be.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by tpeng on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:07PM (#7532782)
Vanguard is in the business of selling index funds. It's Vanguard's incentive for mutual funds and hedge funds to face unnecessary taxes on their trades. This lowers the returns of active investing versus passive investing. What's bad for everyone else is good for Vanguard.

It's true that IEX is a dark pool, and that other dark pools exist that purport to favor natural traders, but IEX is moving toward an ECN and full-fledged exchange in a staged launch. Other dark pools are highly conflicted, lack transparency, lack technical protections, and the biggest difference is that people seem to trust the principals of IEX and the incentives of the ownership structure.

Re:Michael Lewis: shilling for the buyside? by kasey_junk on Friday April 04, 2014 @01:55PM (#7533117)
That trust in the principals of IEX and the ownership structure is precisely what I find so odd.