Also, a lot of smaller coffee shops will just set up a wifi router and give it a password and call it done, when many of them have inherent exploits.
On top of all that, there are lots of Asus routers out there running firmware that can be remotely exploited and for which there is no patch[1]. Or Linksys routers[2]. Or D-Link[3].
All an attacker needs to do is change your DNS server settings and they can send you to any server they want instead of the server that you expected. They could redirect all HTTP and HTTPS requests to common services through their servers, MITM your connections to Facebook, Twitter, Apple, Bank of America, your e-mail, your health insurance website, etc.
On its own it's safe, but if you have control of someone's WiFi router (which is apparently trivial) then it's entirely possible for someone to snoop on a huge swath of your supposedly secure internet traffic.
The only real saving grace here is that OS code signing hasn't been compromised, so the system won't install a backdoor'ed 10.9.2 update. At least that part of the chain is secure and people can update.
[1] http://threatpost.com/unpatched-vulnerabilities-disclosed-in-asus-home-routers/101317
[2] http://www.pcworld.com/article/2098520/exploit-released-for-vulnerability-targeted-by-linksys-router-worm.html
[3] http://hexus.net/tech/news/network/61245-easy-exploit-backdoor-found-several-d-link-router-models/Also WPA-PSK is useless for coffee shops because you have to give the PSK to everyone, and with that the ability to impersonate the AP. For that purpose, EAP/TLS is better, assuming you take care to verify the AP's certificate.
This isn't true of home networks using PSK, where the AP and the client need an identical PSK in order to authenticate each other. Yes, each other - if you successfully connect to an AP using a PSK, you can be pretty sure that AP knows the same key, and probably isn't someone impersonating it (note however that anyone with the PSK can impersonate the access point).
Remember kids, when you connect to a network without a PSK or more elaborate authentication where you verify the identity of the AP, you generally have no idea who is operating that network.
In SSL, you have the certificate and the key; the key is private and secret, and the certificate is public. A public certificate which is wrong (e.g. self-signed) does you no good because browsers won't trust it (and many of them have made it frustrating to try to bypass the warning).
Wouldn't you need to have control of the router Starbucks is using to set up the MITM attack?