Package "OSXUpdCombo10.9.2.pkg":
Status: signed Apple Software
Certificate Chain:
1. Software Update
SHA1 fingerprint: 1E 34 E3 91 C6 44 37 DD 24 BE 57 B1 66 7B 2F DA 09 76 E1 FD
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2. Apple Software Update Certification Authority
SHA1 fingerprint: FA 02 79 0F CE 9D 93 00 89 C8 C2 51 0B BC 50 B4 85 8E 6F BF
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3. Apple Root CA
SHA1 fingerprint: 61 1E 5B 66 2C 59 3A 08 FF 58 D1 4A E2 24 52 D1 98 DF 6C 60TLS is not used to authenticate the update.
Yes. That's the marketing page explaining how Gatekeeper works, but yes, in the end it's a feature of Gatekeeper that makes it harder for you to open unsigned packages and impossible to open packages with a broken signature.
So even when you don't know about pkgutil (most people don't), Gatekeeper will still help you.
1. Use linux/fbsd/obsd/win box to download update.
2. Verify authenticity of cert/sha1
3. scp dmg / copy to USB drive
4. Apply update and move on.If you're 13, add "duh" at the end.
Did the mother of your thirteen year old preface her question with "I already tried to use curl but then I realized that would not work. Then I thought I could verify the SHA1 but I realized I was obtaining the sha1 value over an insecure channel."?
I agree that context matters. That's why statistically the proposed solution isn't a solution. It doesn't really work in a way that address the serious issue because the serious issue is the sheer magnitude of the number of compromised systems.
To put it another way, if you have a Linux or Windows or BSD box why keep a potentially deeply compromised OSX installation around at all. The patch isn't going to unpwn a pwnd box. The hoops might insure the patch isn't compromised but in terms of system security the horse is out of the barn and all the way to the glue factory.
The only case where jumping through those hoops makes a difference is in the second best case. And that's statistically equivalent to the best case and preparing for the best case in regard to security goes by the name of "wishful thinking."
Oh, good: there's a standalone installer available (http://support.apple.com/kb/DL1726). But the download is served over HTTP. Maybe I can just try the same URL with HTTPS:
Nope. Well, at least I can verify the SHA1 sum displayed on the download page. Wait, no, that was served over HTTP, too.Okay, I'll follow Apple's instructions for checking the certificate fingerprint in the installer (http://support.apple.com/kb/ht5044). But that page (Last modified November 2011) displays a different fingerprint (9C864771 vs FA02790F)...and that fingerprint was also served over HTTP.
Gives up and opens the App Store.