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Re:Prefer mercurial to git by hawkharris on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:04AM (#7247774)
I'm interested in your comment about the cryptographic nature of git objects. I know that hashes are used to identify commits, but I'm not sure how Git uses cryptography elsewhere — e.g. to check the integrity of repos, as you said. Can you explain this aspect in more detail? (Not being argumentative; just curious.)
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Perseids on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:36AM (#7247882)
In git a commit is basically the root of a Merkle Tree[1], i.e. every reference is the sha1 sum of the object being referenced. If you take a commit apart what you see is a commit message, a hash of its parent commit and a hash of a tree object. That tree object itself contains hashes of file objects and tree object as well as their corresponding names. Thus assuming you would want to tamper with a file of a commit this files hash would change and therefore the parent tree objects hash would change and therefore the commit hash would change. So the complete state of the repository is cryptographically secured with just the hash of the commit object. You can find out more about git innards here: http://git-scm.com/book/en/Git-Internals-Git-Objects

To be fair: I believe mercurial commits enjoy the same level of protection, although via different means.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merkle_tree

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by haberman on Sunday February 16, 2014 @11:59AM (#7248235)
> So the complete state of the repository is cryptographically secured

It should be noted, however, that Linus and others specifically disclaim that this is a security mechanism:

"Git uses SHA-1 in a way which has nothing at all to do with security.... It's just the best hash you can get.... It's about the ability to trust your data." --Linus (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SHA-1#Data_integrity)

And in the midst of a discussion about how only professional cryptographers should design crypto, pretty much everyone insists that Git is not crypto (see replies to: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6961683)

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Perseids on Sunday February 16, 2014 @01:54PM (#7248698)
To be honest I don't buy his argument. If it is not about security, why not use md5? It is faster after all and gives you the same protection against accidental data corruption as sha1. And if he cared about security then he should have chosen sha256 or sha512, the latter of which is even faster than sha1 on 64bit systems [1] and can be truncated if you think it is too long.

And really there is no denying that git relies on the security of sha1, especially its second preimage resistance[2]. Otherwise all the signed Linux releases would be useless, because you could exchange the files in the release with your own, malicious ones. Even collision resistance is important, as if you are a rogue kernel developer you can craft two files with identical hashes: One that passes scrutiny upstream and one that has a subtle backdoor. If it is in one those binary blobs there is a very low chance of it ever being found.

My guess is that he did not really put more than 5 minutes of thought into the decision. He has a track record of mediocre understanding of and low regard for cryptographic topics, see for example: http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/1173350/focus=117... .

[1] http://bench.cr.yp.to/results-hash.html

[2] You cannot find another file with the same hash as the given file.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by cdoxsey on Sunday February 16, 2014 @05:56PM (#7249725)
Intel is adding native SHA instructions to x86... so sha1 will probably be much faster on those CPUs.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intel_SHA_extensions

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Perseids on Sunday February 16, 2014 @06:52PM (#7249892)
Interesting…

Note that they also add sha256 specific instructions. Which is good, because sha1 should no longer be used for new application and existing application should definitely start looking into an update path. See [1] for a rough estimate how fast the existing (publicly known) attacks become feasible.

I hope they are also working on implementing the sha3 permutation. That would allow for some really cool features to be super fast and simple like authenticated encryption or reseedable pseudo random number generation[2].

[1] https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/10/when_will_we_... [2] For details see section 5 and 6 of https://eprint.iacr.org/2011/499.pdf

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by haberman on Sunday February 16, 2014 @02:50PM (#7248934)
I am not sure I buy it either. To me it comes off as cognitive dissonance between the party line of "don't invent your own crypto" and the pervasive love and acceptance of Git.

No one wants to say that Git, on which many of our SCM processes are now built, is suspect. But also no one wants to argue that Linus is somehow an exception to the rule against amateur cryptography.

So what we're left with a somewhat ambiguous situation where Git is described as not being crypto despite the fact that in practice people assume it is resistant to malicious attack.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by alinajaf on Sunday February 16, 2014 @08:05PM (#7250082)
> Git is described as not being crypto

Git has plenty of crypto in it, namely GPG (for signing tags), SSH and SSL (for transport). Using off-the-shelf crypto like this doesn't strike me as "inventing your own crypto".

> people assume it is resistant to malicious attack

Exactly what's the threat model here? I can't conceive of a malicious attack that exploits gits reliance of on SHA1 as a message digest that doesn't also require write access to your filesystem.

I think your argument stems from the fact that SHA1 is deemed insecure and therefore anything associated with it must also be insecure. As I said in the previous thread, git doesn't use SHA1 to make any of the guarantees that cryptography is typically used to make.

It's usage is to prevent accidental corruption in the everyday usage of git (the sort that mercurial appears to have been prone to in the past), not to protect against a malicious adversary with write access to the filesystem.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Perseids on Monday February 17, 2014 @03:33AM (#7251132)
> Exactly what's the threat model here? I can't conceive of a malicious attack that exploits gits reliance of on SHA1 as a message digest that doesn't also require write access to your filesystem.

Write access to your filesystem is a threat git is supposed to be secure against (more precisely: the filesystem of your git server) as Haberman has pointed out. Another incident this was relevant is the kernel.org hack: http://www.linuxfoundation.org/news-media/blogs/browse/2011/...

Furthermore, the signed tags are completely worthless if you assume second preimage resistance of sha1 to be broken. Imagine I sit between kernel.org and your computer. When you download the next Linus blessed Linux release I manipulate some of the files to contain some backdoor while still having the same sha1. As you will certainly not check every file manually for bogus content you happily compile and run the manipulated kernel and I have access to your PC via my planted backdoor.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by haberman on Sunday February 16, 2014 @08:55PM (#7250221)
> It's usage is to prevent accidental corruption in the everyday usage of git (the sort that mercurial appears to have been prone to in the past), not to protect against a malicious adversary with write access to the filesystem.

I have evidence that people in practice use it to protect against just this sort of thing: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=7003900

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by tonfa on Sunday February 16, 2014 @04:52PM (#7249499)
> To be fair: I believe mercurial commits enjoy the same level of protection, although via different means.

Actually they have almost exactly the same Merkel tree (there are some minor differences in the metadata that is included, mercurial also includes the file level parents while git does not, for example).

The inspiration came from Monotone.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by cliffbean on Sunday February 16, 2014 @12:01PM (#7248245)
It's worth noting that Git's hashes guard against accidental corruption; they aren't widely thought to be strong against attack by an intelligent adversary.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by mpyne on Sunday February 16, 2014 @12:02PM (#7248251)
That's true, and AFAIK Linus says much the same. SHA1 is used for practical purposes and not security in the face of a determined attacker with cryptanalytic ability.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Hello71 on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:29AM (#7247868)
Every object in the repository, including commits and trees, is hashed via SHA-1. Commits also include the SHA of the previous commit, so if you verify each commit, then compare the SHA at the top to the "correct" one, then that means your entire repository is valid.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by masklinn on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:44AM (#7247924)
> Every object in the repository, including commits and trees, is hashed via SHA-1. Commits also include the SHA of the previous commit

mercurial does pretty much the same, as far as I know.

> so if you verify each commit

But surely that does not happen on every CLI operation does it? So you only find out about corruption when all the repository is traversed and checked, which will usually be explicitly or on clone. Thus the same as hg.

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by DannyBee on Sunday February 16, 2014 @11:57AM (#7248222)
actually, it's possible to execute clone in git without it checking. If you do a local clone, it will happily hand you a broken repo.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by rmetzler on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:29AM (#7247864)
Committers are able to sign their commit with their GPG key.

Edit: I was wrong and changed all the words

Re:Prefer mercurial to git by jedbrown on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:36AM (#7247884)
Everything about this comment is wrong. Commits are never signed [EDIT: it is possible since 2011, but rarely used; thanks zobzu]. Annotated tags can be signed via PGP (not SSH keys), but the public key is not stored in the repository (unless you put it there manually, as with the tag "junio-gpg-pub" in git.git, which is not even Junio's current signing key). In practice, people obtain keys from PGP keyservers.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by zobzu on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:40AM (#7247905)
I can't reply to a child of this comment, but yes, this comment is entirely wrong. However, Git can indeed sign commits (using gpg), not just tags. "git commit -S"
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by Hello71 on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:30AM (#7247870)
Not by default it isn't. And git uses GPG, not SSH keys.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by rmetzler on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:38AM (#7247892)
You're right, I was wrong. I'm sorry.
Re:Prefer mercurial to git by blibble on Sunday February 16, 2014 @10:49AM (#7247941)