There's a reason that gpg does this..... Maria's twitter being hacked, Maria's github being hacked, Maria's Keystore being hacked....a lot can go wrong.
There are still weaknesses like, you lie about a github and link to your own github, and lie about the public key. And...many others.
Also, WoT works best when people meet other people they trust in person and sign each other's keys as the GNU/Linux community encourages. https://www.kernel.org/signature.html Then it's possible to get other people's keys elsewhere on the planet and know they're probably good given they're signed by someone you trust.
GPG mail plugins that popup a barcode that someone else can scan with their laptop's webcam or some mobile app.
GPG mail plugins should also have a search toolbar that can quickly get a key so it can be verified.
Mobile platforms must support GPG natively, many only support S/MIME.
SSL CAs:GnuPG (GPG/PGP) -> Subversion:Git
Rather, the server replies with links to tweets, gists, etc. -- maria's public identity proofs. The keybase client does not trust that these are honest, so it scrapes them directly and makes sure they were signed by the same public key that the server provided. In other words, the server could reply with a different maria, and simply lie, but not with the real maria's github or twitter account.
The server could also lie by omission, leaving out an identity. But it cannot invent ones that do not exist, without the client knowing.
Again, the premise here is that maria is the sum of her online identities.
The website itself is of course a different story. When you look up maria on keybase's website, you are trusting that keybase.io did not lie about her github account. Fortunately you can confirm by following the link to her gist, where she announced her keybase username and posted her key fingerprint.