Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by devicenull on Thursday February 13, 2014 @09:13AM
(#7231446)
Yes. And that's exactly what's been implemented in modern versions of ntpd (> 4.2.7p26, 2010/04/24... yes, 2010).
The problem is: 1) No one has upgraded NTPD (and often can't, for embedded devices like IPMI controllers) 2) This can be fixed by basic configuration in older NTPD versions, but up until recently many linux distributions were shipping vulnerable configs.
This particular command (monlist) is a management query, it's in no way related to serving up accurate time.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by michaelmior on Thursday February 13, 2014 @10:04AM
(#7231696)
As far as I can tell, the default Ubuntu ntpd config still allows monlist. (That is, /etc/ntp.conf in saucy doesn't have disable monitor.)
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by makomk on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:44AM
(#7232321)
The Debian default config has noquery set for everywhere but localhost which is I believe safer (disables all ntpdc queries not just the one used here). Ubuntu's likely the same.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by michaelmior on Thursday February 13, 2014 @12:05PM
(#7232483)
The default Ubuntu config has the following
restrict -4 default kod notrap nomodify nopeer noquery
restrict -6 default kod notrap nomodify nopeer noquery
Edit: Note that this also exists in Ubuntu 12.04, so the latest LTS is fine as well.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by michaelmior on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:49AM
(#7232360)
Yes, noquery is enabled (at least in saucy). It isn't however in precise, which is the current LTS. I'm unclear of the difference between noquery and disable monitor.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by devicenull on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:19AM
(#7232150)
disable monitor is not really the best way to fix this. You're better off adding 'noquery' to the end of the 'restrict default' lines.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by michaelmior on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:49AM
(#7232364)
Thanks for clarifying. I'm not familiar with ntpd configuration as it's something I usually just install and forget about.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by dfc on Thursday February 13, 2014 @11:13AM
(#7232108)
What are the default restrictions? Is noquery enabled?
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by the_mitsuhiko on Thursday February 13, 2014 @09:13AM
(#7231447)
UDP is a message. It's the same as sending a letter with the sender's address on. You can lie about your own address, but if you want the other person to send you a reply it's better to write the correct information on.
Re:Technical Details Behind a 400Gbps NTP Amplification DDoS...
by corresation on Thursday February 13, 2014 @09:15AM
(#7231462)
TCP establishes a two way connection (SYN, SYN-ACK, ACK), so you can send the original SYN but the SYN-ACK will go to someone else and be discarded. UDP is fire and forget, in contrast.
There is a proposal from 2000 that is mentioned in the article (http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2827) that recommends that source networks filter out originating traffic that isn't legitimate. It is being implemented slowly.
Is this not an issue for TCP?
EDIT: I'm assuming it's because UDP doesn't do any checking / acknowledge stuff by default?