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Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by sneak on Monday February 03, 2014 @11:13AM (#7171408)
The real questions:

a) Why does Wired, a tech pub who should know better, seem entirely ignorant of the existence of PFS cipher suites?

b) Why wasn't Lavabit using PFS? Then key compromise is mostly irrelevant as long as you're not incarcerated and can scream bloody murder.

Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by wmeredith on Monday February 03, 2014 @11:24AM (#7171485)
Wired is pretty bad when it comes to actual journalism. I've noted this elsewhere on HN in the past (and have seen others echo my sentiments) but any time I read one of their stories covering a field where i have a lot of knowledge, they always get basic concepts as well as things like simple domain vernacular wrong. I can only assume this also applies to areas where I have little expertise. The more knowledgeable about tech I become, the more I view Wired as a tabloid/click bait farm.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by rsingel on Monday February 03, 2014 @05:22PM (#7173941)
Really, Kevin Poulsen is the Wired writer you are going to pick on?

He co-created Secure Drop with Aaron Swartz. If your memory doesn't go back that far, there was that cool article the other day about how a hacker reverse-engineered OKCupid. He's written stories that have put pedophiles in jail and exposed the FBI's use of malware on criminal suspects.

Someone else can defend Wired in toto these days, but, I will say it'd be hard to choose a less appropriate writer as proof for your first sentence.

And, yes, Poulsen was my former boss and editor.

Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by BlackDeath3 on Monday February 03, 2014 @07:15PM (#7174569)
Interestingly, the post to which you're replying never actually refers to Kevin Poulsen, neither explicitly nor (as far as I'm concerned) implicitly.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by krakensden on Tuesday February 04, 2014 @02:13AM (#7175927)
Kevin Poulsen's name is on TFA.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by BlackDeath3 on Tuesday February 04, 2014 @02:18AM (#7175939)
I understand that. Where does the poster ever specifically mention "the fucking article" as the target of their discontent? It's directed at Wired as a whole, is it not?
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by wmeredith on Sunday February 09, 2014 @03:07PM (#7206946)
Eh, you lay down with dogs you get up with fleas. I didn't even look at the byline. I just knew it was from Wired.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by canvia on Monday February 03, 2014 @04:07PM (#7173491)
They have many different contributing writers. Some are better than others. Same goes for the NYT or any other large journalistic organization.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by bskari on Monday February 03, 2014 @12:58PM (#7172315)
b) Ladar talked about this in an interview with Leo Laporte from October. He says "I looked into [using PFS]. The version of OpenSSL I was running in production at the time didn't support Diffie Hellman. That's a newer addition to the SSL protocol. I did support it in my development tree and I thought about upgrading, but it really came down to two things. One, I was worried I could get hit with an obstruction of justice or a contempt of court order if I did that knowing with full knowledge what they were trying to do ... Here's the other problem. Even if you're offering perfect forward security, very few clients would have taken advantage of it, particularly mail clients."

The discussion starts at about 32:40. http://twit.tv/show/triangulation/125

Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by rsingel on Monday February 03, 2014 @05:15PM (#7173906)
1) The story explicitly refers to PFS.

2) Ladar has explained this. And even with PFS, if a service provider hands over SSL keys and gets hit with a gag order, perfect secrecy only helps in regards to past communications.

Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by falcolas on Monday February 03, 2014 @12:20PM (#7171966)
It's only irrelevant for the past, not the future. So, even a PFS service is compromised once the private key is compromised and the MITM is established.
Re:Judges Poised to Hand U.S. Spies the Keys to the Internet by MiWCryptohn on Tuesday February 04, 2014 @04:37AM (#7176422)
PFS doesn't provide any resistance against an active attacker; ie: one that can substitute any message between the client and server.

pFs provides resistance to previously passively recorded cipher texts being decrypted when the static secret key is disclosed. It does this by ensuring the session key exchange is protected by an ephemeral key; it is not possible to derive the session key from any static configuration, ie: rsa private key.

With the PFS ciphers, the static secret key provides server authentication; so you know your talking to the correct server or in this case FBI carnivore device. The mitm appliance can even support PFS between you and it so you wouldn't even know the difference!