He co-created Secure Drop with Aaron Swartz. If your memory doesn't go back that far, there was that cool article the other day about how a hacker reverse-engineered OKCupid. He's written stories that have put pedophiles in jail and exposed the FBI's use of malware on criminal suspects.
Someone else can defend Wired in toto these days, but, I will say it'd be hard to choose a less appropriate writer as proof for your first sentence.
And, yes, Poulsen was my former boss and editor.
The discussion starts at about 32:40. http://twit.tv/show/triangulation/125
2) Ladar has explained this. And even with PFS, if a service provider hands over SSL keys and gets hit with a gag order, perfect secrecy only helps in regards to past communications.
pFs provides resistance to previously passively recorded cipher texts being decrypted when the static secret key is disclosed. It does this by ensuring the session key exchange is protected by an ephemeral key; it is not possible to derive the session key from any static configuration, ie: rsa private key.
With the PFS ciphers, the static secret key provides server authentication; so you know your talking to the correct server or in this case FBI carnivore device. The mitm appliance can even support PFS between you and it so you wouldn't even know the difference!
a) Why does Wired, a tech pub who should know better, seem entirely ignorant of the existence of PFS cipher suites?
b) Why wasn't Lavabit using PFS? Then key compromise is mostly irrelevant as long as you're not incarcerated and can scream bloody murder.