Thus, only in that particular targeted environment will the next layer be revealed. While it is true that, as you say, Anything like that is not really fundamentally different from a password, that password might require physical possession of the target machine.
Unless the entropy that's the input key is something ephemeral, it's only a matter of time before the key is found. And in the case of malware, you can pretty much assume that the victim/target does have physical possession of the machine.
Yes, it is a matter of time, so long as you can run this experiment on every unique hardware environment.
It's like DRM: the user must have the key, so the only security you can have lies in obfuscation.
But in the case of Flame, wasn't that (one of) the big problem(s)? That the researchers didn't know what, exactly, comprised a known-vulnerable host?
And if you're decrypting a program and doing something that people notice, it's a matter of time before someone is able to capture the decrypted code and work backwards from that.
The decryption routine is a rather obvious place to look; does the routine check if something is decrypted properly before jumping into that code, or does it decrypt, jump, and crash if the key is wrong? If it checks, then that's the ideal place to stop the program, dump the memory, and see what's going on. If it doesn't check, you're going to have malware that's crashing all the time and fairly easy to detect for that reason. If you're trying to do something under the radar, the last thing you want is unstable malware.
So yeah, traditional obfuscation is just a speed bump, and too much of it might make things detectable. The underlying problem is that the software has to DO something useful (read a file, send network packets, etc), and it's extremely hard to hide that on hardware you don't control.
But like any security, depending on the goal, maybe a speed bump is good enough.