In LedgerSMB, for example, we use app login credentials as db credentials for internal users, but for customer/vendor portals, we use a single user account for the portal. There are a lot of reasons for this but PostgreSQL is flexible enough one can (relatively easily) limit most users to the LedgerSMB app if one wants (via pg_hba.conf). The goal however is to allow non-web apps with the same credentials and security enforcement and we already have some of those.
So it isn't necessarily a facepalm. It really depends on context. There can be valid reasons for it but those are not in the context of a public-facing web site. I.e. if you expect users only to access the db through a single app then you don't want to use it but if you want the db to be accessed through a group of apps then using the db as a SSO technology is actually pretty smart.
Sure there are situations where it is OK, but as a rule of thumb it's not a terribly good idea.
Hahahaha. If you are going to use db credentials, for the love of the gods, at least consider using the db to enforce access controls...... That's just common sense, IMNSHO....
Microsoft provides a lot of security features that are backed into asp.net that are pretty trivial to enable. From what, little, that I know about php I am not sure the same can be said. I believe that would make a bigger difference about perceived security of a platform
It might be. At a certain point, the coin is more likely "broken" (or rigged somehow) than actually flipping tails every time. The chances of flipping a coin 10 times in a row tails are ~1/1000, so I do not think this is in the range, but at 100 flips, I would say that it is much more likely that the coin has been tampered with.
That being said, I once tested a ancient Java web app that recommended you use IE 5.5 (for the latest features). The people who made it decided it would be a good idea for the site to send the database credentials to the browser, which would then send them when requesting data. I face palmed pretty hard.