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Re:Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest by venomsnake on Friday December 20, 2013 @07:27AM (#6941076)
Well create metadata resistant protocol that communicates on set intervals of time with set length of random data when there is no real payload. This could be done on TLS with little or no effort. The math behind the crypto is strong enough. No need to harden it further.

Every client sends and receives 16KB blob every 30 seconds - this way you could prevent analysis that you are communicating with someone. You could learn a lot just from the size and frequency of packets in a normal chat program.

Re:Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest by oakwhiz on Friday December 20, 2013 @08:00AM (#6941172)
It seems like there is a 'No-Free-Lunch' tradeoff between bandwidth efficiency and traffic analysis resistance.
Re:Telegram’s Cryptanalysis Contest by venomsnake on Friday December 20, 2013 @08:42AM (#6941300)
I prefer the later to the former in a heartbeat.