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Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by omegant on Sunday December 15, 2013 @07:39AM (#6909187)
Airline pilot here with experience in B737, MD 80 and Airbus A320, so I know the flight controls philosophy of each one and the main differences.

-First of all, it is what it seems, it´s an elementary piloting failure. Once you disconnect the Autopilot and/or auto-throttle you must be first of all flying the plane on it´s envelope then navigating and last combating an emergency (if there is one).

-Second, I´ve heard first hand how the basic piloting skills like a visual approach or manual flying are very scarce in several Asian countries, one of them is Korean. This is due to the initial and airline training philosophy, for example Chinese copilots are not allowed to take the controls for landing or take off EVER (they have eternal training periods that are useless as they have no skills at all to learn ) I´dont know if this is true for all companies but at least several big ones work like this. Opposite to this in European and American companies, flight officers do half of the take off and landings due for the day, the only difference between a captain and copilot is that the captain is the one who decides the big questions, but the copilot is required to have the same piloting skills. In this case they were two captains one of them an instructor.. No words.

-third, there is an American instructor who wrote at Pprune (a pilot forum) about how for Korean pilots (trained in Korea), the worst emergency they can suffer in a simulator is a visual approach. Even worst than losing both engines or total hydraulic failure. They are scared to death of visual flying. . He was fired from Asiana for failing to pass the annual exam to one of Asiana´s top pilots for failing a common visual approach. It seems that due to the problems with North K. it´s not possible to flight small airplanes and practice the basic skills. I can not find the article right now, I think it was erased shortly after being posted.

-Fourth, it´s common to do mistakes with the flight modes while on final approach, both with airbus and Boeing, there are several descend and ascend modes, speed modes, and auto-throttle modes. But basically is that if you are high you want to descend faster, if you are low, you want to reduce your descend or even climb (in case of obstacles ahead), and you want to keep your speed inside the restricted limits needed to flight with the flaps for landing (too fast and they bend, too slow and you crash). When a mistake happens is normal to disconnect the autopilot and/or auto-throttle and take over on manual. But of course you are aware of what´s happening, is like going with the cruise control on the car, disconnecting it and failing to brake at the next light.

-Fifth, there are differences between airbus and Boeing, an airbus would have done an automatic full throttle to recover the low speed. But this kind of automatic behavior has other costs, for example the Air France´s A330 that crashed in my opinion was due to an overconfidence in such automatic recover. The problem (and this is my opinion) is that the pilot flying thought that just pulling the stick the airplane would do the rest to recover whatever he thought was happening ( Once it was in to a deep stall, it was impossible for the computer to recognize what was happening).

I think that crashing in crystal clear weather on a big airport just because you don´t know how to flight manually is a problem that some companies and countries have with the flight instruction philosophy, no amount of technology is going to solve that. Now Airbus is trying to increase the manual training of the pilots just because this same reason. They just went too far automatizing the flight, but airplanes and computers fail, and when they do it while flying you just can not stop everything to solve the problem, you have to land the plane safely no matter what.

Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by hglaser on Sunday December 15, 2013 @01:21PM (#6910232)
-third, there is an American instructor who wrote at Pprune (a pilot forum) about how for Korean pilots (trained in Korea), the worst emergency they can suffer in a simulator is a visual approach ... I can not find the article right now, I think it was erased shortly after being posted.

Here's a reprint. It's very interesting: http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/3041469/posts

Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by aleph_naught on Sunday December 15, 2013 @01:53PM (#6910339)
> The Koreans are very very bright and smart so I was puzzled by their inability to fly an airplane well. They would show up on Day 1 of training (an hour before the scheduled briefing time, in a 3-piece suit, and shined shoes) with the entire contents of the FCOM and Flight Manual totally memorized. But, putting that information to actual use was many times impossible. Crosswind landings are also an unsolvable puzzle for most of them. I never did figure it out completely, but I think I did uncover a few clues. Here is my best guess. First off, their educational system emphasizes ROTE memorization from the first day of school as little kids. As you know, that is the lowest form of learning and they act like robots. They are also taught to NEVER challenge authority and in spite of the flight training heavily emphasizing CRM/CLR, it still exists either on the surface or very subtly. You just cant change 3000 years of culture.

I've experienced this throughout my professional career as an engineer, to the point where I am very reluctant to work with foreign born asians. I find that this trait is very cultural, as it is almost completely absent in asians that were born in the US.

Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by notastartup on Wednesday December 25, 2013 @05:03AM (#6962724)
holy crap that article scared the crap out of me, if what he says is true, I am not flying with pilots out of Korean flight school. What he says about the culture of rote memorization and lack of outside box thinking holds some merit before we all cry about how this has nothing to do with East Asian culture. I don't give a damn about culture but if it's preventing you from being able to pass a flying simulation test that is standard, it pretty much makes me NOT want to fly with that airline.

I don't care if American airlines offer crappy inflight customer service compared to Asiana airlines, I DEMAND a pilot that have the qualification to fly and land the airplane in all possible scenarios. If Asiana pilots can't even pass the flight sims, no way in hell I'm letting them fly the plane.

I'm just so angry after reading the article. How fucking hard can it be? I played Microsoft Flight Simulator since 4.5 since the DOS version. Of course the flight simulation is more difficult than a simulator on the computer but I am trying to illustrate how ridiculous the Korean pilots attitude is. It's like they treat it as some demeaning labor (Korean society judges a person a lot by their occupation if it's not a traditionally Confucius approved position like scholar, professor, lawyer, doctor, prosecutor). You are responsible for hundreds of peoples lives and you can't even land the fucking plane on a flight simulator via visual approach because you are afraid of screwing up or looking bad in front of your superior officer? You can't even say that the emperor is naked because someone above you says he isn't?

And why the hell did that Korean American pilot for Asiana or KAL get arrested and JAILED, for starting a union? Was he suspected of being a communist for wanting to be paid by the flight hour time?

Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by rlu on Sunday December 15, 2013 @02:52PM (#6910574)
When a mistake happens is normal to disconnect the autopilot and/or auto-throttle and take over on manual.

Is the mistake that they made here that they used the flight level change mode for final approach where they shouldn't have done that to begin with? Or what is the mistake they made they caused them to turn off autopilot?

My second question is the one I originally had when reading the article:

The pilot flying responded by disconnecting the autopilot and manually retarding the throttles to idle. In this configuration, the autopilot was not commanding the airplane, although the system made inputs to the flight directors because it was still in flight level change mode.

I don't understand this. What does it mean to turn off autopilot but still have the plane give input due to the AP mode? Is what the article saying that the pilot simply turned off the AP voice warnings but left the AP input on? - if so, I don't understand why that should even be possible.

What are the scenarios where you would want to leave the AP inputs on but switch off the audio warnings other than the pilot "finding them annoying" (!!) ?

Re:Sequence of Events in the Cockpit on Asiana Flight 214 by omegant on Sunday December 15, 2013 @03:49PM (#6910791)
They were flying with vertical speed, with that mode you tell exactly to the AP how fast you want to go up or down( 1000ft/min is anormal rate for approach). For that mode you don't need a lower capture altitude selected if you are descending (or the opossite if you are climbing). So they set the go around altitude on the selector, this is done to be prepared in case of a go around and the altitude is given by the standart approach procedure you are performing. So they are descending but the altitude selected is higher than them. Till this point there is nothing unusuall if you are flying a visual approach. Then they realize they are descending too slowly and they are high on the approach. This is not unusual nor dangerous. To loose that excess altitude they select the descend mode "Level Change", this means that the plane is going to capture the selected altitude, if it's higher it will apply power and climb, if it's lower it will set the engines to iddle and descend. As they had selected a higher altitude the plane set climb power and rised the attitude to climb. Not even this moment is dangerous, as I said it happens sometimes. They disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle and begun to descend manually. As they had excess altitude the speed is was not a problem initially you change altitude for speed, and descend at a faster rate to reach the ideal glide slope. All this is a quite usuall procedure that we perform quite often when high on the glide. Their mistake was that once they reached the desired visual glide path from above you need to apply a bit of power (around 50%N1 ) to reduce the descend and keep the speed. They correctly pulled the nose to follow the glide but forgot to apply power. Then the speed started to decrease slowly till it went too far down and they stalled into the ground. The reply to the second question is that they disconnected the autopilot and autothrottle, but the flight director was still on and trying to go up. The flight director are two bars located at the center of the artificial horizont that tell you were you need to put the airplane symbol to flight the selected path. It helps quite a lot, because manual flying inside the clouds requires a lot of concentration on the basic positions of the artificial horizont,speed and heading. The flight director makes it much easier so you can concentrate in other tasks. It's recommended that when you are flying visually and ignoring the flight director, to disconnect it so it doesnt give you misleading indications. This happened to them, they were descending but the FD was telling them to climb (as it had been selected eith level change). This maybe disconcerted them when they reached te visual glide. But the biggest problem was their failure to apply power manuallyto the thrust levers. Sorry for the wall of text, but I'm writing from my Iphon and I can't make the intro work and separate the text in paragraphs.