Likewise we can already simulate fairly large biochemically accurate neural networks, and it seems a scaling in power would lead to an AGI.
The problem with the previous models is their inefficiency. It does seem to indicate a lack of understanding of fundamentals -- i.e. you can brute force essentially every well defined problem in CS, yet we don't declare them solved modulo some time for computing power progress.
If you mean "predict" in the same sense as it's used in the phrase "predictive model", then the answer could be a resounding no - there's a hypothesis that the brain implements just one basic learning algorithm, and everything else is just emergent phenomena coming out of that.
I would define reasoning as answering a question or optimization problem, e.g. What is my best move? What is a good move? This can be formalized as calculating some kind of score for a possible action, whereas prediction is just about assigning a probability value to an event.
Regarding winning, there's no way to improve one's chances (besides cheating?). But merely knowing that the game is predicated solely on chance can be useful for other applications. E.g. realizing that the lottery is a scam.
Personally, I'm in that camp that says reasoning is a instrumental value towards prediction.
So would it be fair to summarize this as "reason is prediction with a goal"?
Here I really struggle to follow his argument. It seems, he is saying that thinking is not prediction, but how does he know that? As I see it, we don't know what thinking is, so is he then saying that thinking does not feel like prediction, and therefore it cannot be prediction? It is well known that we are only aware of our very highest level of thought. What goes on below the surface may very well be very much about prediction without us knowing about. When we think about "the world" we must have some internal representation of the configuration of objects that we think about. In my opinion this is implicitly a kind of prediction, because we create (at least mostly) configurations that are plausible, if not true (counterfactual, but possible).
It seems to me that creativity is mostly about finding good approximate solutions to hard (e.g. NP-complete) problems. How we do it is so far unknown, but it seems that it is not in principle so very special. The explanation for the calendar he speaks about is actually not very complicated inference at all, and is probably in reach for artificial systems. All he has to do is to generalize 19 as belonging to a number category, and then apply the predictive properties about how numbers work. Not all prediction is naively predicting that the world is as it was before. If change is predictable in the past, then change can also be predicted to the future. Prediction is difficult, but that does not make it less important.