What I don't understand is why anyone trusted businesses (such as CertiVox and Lavabit) to keep their emails secure?
If the businesses themselves couldn't decrypt these emails, there's nothing the government could usefully ask them for.
Because they didn't consider "because terrorism" to be a security threat that could penetrate privacy and property laws. Lavabit has proven that the Third-Party Doctrine means that once you give data to a business, you're giving it to the government.
I have an email I want to be secure.
Why am I giving this data to Lavabit in a form that they can decrypt? (Forget the government for the moment.)
Why aren't these systems engineered to mean that only _I_ have the key to decrypt them?
My point is that if I did want secure email, I wouldn't trust a company whose email system architecture meant that they could read my email.
A personal email server might be a good solution, but then you have to maintain it. It seems as though it should be possible for a company to build an email system (and offer it as a service to customers) whereby they _couldn't_ read user's email.
This seems like a good thing. (And as a nice side-effect, the government can't then issue them with a warrant to read your email. Although that's not to say they can't read your email in other ways.)
http://www.legaltechnology.com/latest-news/data-security-in-...
The upset in the threat model is that you can no longer trust that a business is free to choose according to self interest. You have to assume the government will be force-feeding it laxatives.
One of the best things to come out of all these revelations, in my opinion, is a revised view of what threats we should consider which were previously dismissed as paranoid ramblings.