Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by warfangle on Tuesday October 29, 2013 @05:17PM
(#6637506)
NYC subways have additional safety features - if the track signals indicate stop (due to imminent collision with another train, for example), there are tripcocks. These raise from the tracks, and catch on the bottom of the train, causing it to hard break immediately.
Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by twistedpair on Tuesday October 29, 2013 @06:50PM
(#6638083)
Failsafes don't always fail safely. Take the unmanned Chicago subway train that cruised through the failsafes and crashed into another train, two weeks ago. Another article quotes a CTA official as not knowing how it could have escaped the yard without the brakes tripping.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/04/cta-blue-line-crash...
Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by wanderr on Wednesday October 30, 2013 @03:44AM
(#6640059)
Reminds me of http://www.amazon.com/Systemantics-Systems-Work-Especially-T...
"Fail-safe systems fail by failing to fail safe." - John Gall
Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by warfangle on Tuesday October 29, 2013 @11:40PM
(#6639321)
Yowch! I hadn't heard about that.
Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by infinotize on Tuesday October 29, 2013 @04:56PM
(#6637360)
Those mechanical overrides can still come in handy: http://www.timeout.com/newyork/film/the-hot-seat-samuel-l-ja... [granted, incident allegedly from 1990, but still applicable]
Re:Toyota's firmware: Bad design and its consequences
by decktech on Thursday October 31, 2013 @12:51PM
(#6647916)
Many of the newer NYC trains, I am told, are more complicated - an emergency lever pull (someone caught in the doors) should hard-brake the train. If it's travelled more than 1000 feet, it is assumed the train is already in the tunnel, and the lever just signals the conductor, who presumably will radio for help and tell the operator to hold at the next station. I guess this implies that there's a computer inline.
The tripcocks, I hope, are still connected directly to the brakes.
That part I assume is on purpose, because even a computerized system could have "stop immediately" as the default policy when the emergency lever is pulled. Would be interesting to read the analysis that led to the decision. My guess is that it's because on-train issues are statistically the most likely emergency situation a passenger would signal (heart attacks, fights, etc.), in which case continuing to the next station (typically 30-90 seconds) where emergency staff can meet the train and access it, rather than stopping in the middle of a subway tunnel or elevated rail segment, is the most sensible policy.