Re:Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5...
by tptacek on Monday October 14, 2013 @05:03PM
(#6549627)
RC4 was first used as a mitigation for the BEAST blockwise-adaptive attack on CBC-with-chained-IVs from SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0, and then again as a mitigation for the "Lucky 13" timing-based CBC padding oracle that remains a problem in TLS 1.2 when block ciphersuites are used.
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Re:Why Android SSL was downgraded from AES256-SHA to RC4-MD5...
by maaku on Monday October 14, 2013 @07:31PM
(#6550360)
Ok, thank you. I misread - I thought you meant that there were clients which weren't capable of handling block cipher suites (e.g. for performance reasons). You made me look into "Lucky 13" though, so at least I learned something!