Maybe someone has some good articles about this, but I have a feeling they mean to slowly (for the definition of slow applicable here) replace tissue in the brain so you gradually turn 'silicon' (or whatever it may be) and 'hope' that it mimics every cell close enough and slow enough so that you will remain you after the transition? In which there will never be 2 'you's in this process, however it will be possible to clone/backup your brain after the process? I'm concerned with the 'hope' of it being like this and it would be very optimistic to think we can reach this kind of understanding of the brain within 40 years imho.
Why? A copy of me IS me.
>There is no magic 'soul' or whatever flying over during the transfer taking the self with it.
The information in your brain IS your soul, basically. What else defines "you" if not that?
>Another instance of me is not me; everyone will think it's me (I will think so too, however I see a nice psychological Philip K Dickian mess coming up with you thinking the rest of your life that you are not you) but it's not. I wouldn't really care at all for that kind of 'immortality'.
I can not understand this preference, it just makes no sense to me. As long as one copy of me lives on that is all that matters. It doesn't matter which copy. The specific atoms that make me up don't matter. Why would it matter if I live on being made up of one set of atoms or another?
So you are talking either in a way where the 'self' is shared (both think they are the original even though that contradicts their own knowledge) or you don't care if you die as long as a clone of you lives on (but then you will die; for you as the original 'self' it's lights-out). The latter is not immortality to me, at least no more than having kids (which is actually a big reason many people have kids) and the first makes no logical sense.
Perhaps you are hung up over the fact they diverge by a few seconds of experience? I would trade losing some memories for immortality. People take drugs or suffer from brain damage which has similar effects and I don't consider them "dead". In any case making a copy of the person is likely to be a destructive process, so that isn't even an issue (there's no reason to keep your physical brain after you upload it to a computer.)
Making a copy of the person isn't any different than if I just took the person and replaced all the atoms in their brain instantly with different ones. Hell this could be happening to you every second and you would have no idea. (In our universe, at least, it isn't even possible, since atoms are all identical and don't have little tags saying "atom 1250". I'm just trying to give an idea why basing your identity on a physical object makes no sense.)
If you don't consider your experiences and brain state to be you, and you don't consider the physical object of your brain to be you, then I have no idea how you define personal identity.