Lavabit doesn't do this, they support non-forward secure ones. Worse, they don't offer a cipher-suit order preference and the cipher suits they offer are actually pretty shitty (no ECDH_ECDSA, 1024bit DHE).
The way they have it configured now means anyone using the default browser on windows(IE) or OSX(Safari) doesn't end up negotiating a forward secure session. Chrome and Firefox do end up being forward secure. See SSL Lab's test result here[0]
They support TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
[0]https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=https%3A%2F%2...
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=www.bankofame...
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=chaseonline.c...
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=online.citiba...
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=us.hsbc.com&s...
https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=online.wellsf...
Ideally, Microsoft, Google, Apple, and Firefox would gang up and all disable ciphersuites lacking DHE/ECDHE in their current browsers. Short of that, one browser disabling them would be viewed as "broken" and would lose marketshare.
Much more graceful than a complete switch-over and doesn't require co-ordination from other vendors.
Browsers permit connecting with non-FS ciphers because there are many many servers out there with cipher lists based on older versions of SSL/TLS, and users would complain if they upgraded Firefox and couldn't connect to their bank.
Servers permit connecting with non-FS ciphers because excluding them would block users with older browsers from accessing the server, and give them a confusing unhelpful error page.
It is possible for the server owner to permit only FS ciphers (and therefore impose a strict version requirement on browssers).
That aside, this still leaves the very important question of SMTP traffic.