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Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by fennecfoxen on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @09:16AM (#6514585)
> it's not [the government] who designed lavabit such that it was impossible to execute this without obtaining access to every other user.

That's true, but they're still essentially implying that services which are explicitly designed to omit backdoor capabilities for the government to spy on you -- that is, services offering actual cryptographically guaranteed privacy, not just "no one has looked yet, and if they did, it'll all turn out okay in the end trust us" -- are broadly illegal and will get you criminal contempt.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by stonemetal on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @09:23AM (#6514629)
It has always been illegal to not comply with search warrants. Why would search warrants for digital data be any different?
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by bigiain on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @09:36AM (#6514736)
It's also always been legal to say "sorry, we never record any of that information". You can get a warrant asking a bartender to provide you with names, addresses, and arrival and departure times, and transcripts of every conversation of every patron of his bar, and he can stand up in court and say "sorry, I don't have that information, and I'm not prepared to start collecting it.". Would you be happy for the FBI to be able to compel a bar owner to start collecting those records for everybody who walks into his bar? Without letting either new patrons or regulars know he was doing so?
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by lmm on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @10:28AM (#6515165)
>You can get a warrant asking a bartender to provide you with names, addresses, and arrival and departure times, and transcripts of every conversation of every patron of his bar

No, you can't; the courts don't issue warrants like that. They'd issue a warrant for that information for one particular patron whom they already had reasonable suspicion of.

If the FBI have a warrant to put a bug on one regular's table, that doesn't seem unreasonable. If the bartender's carefully built the bar so that you can hear every conversation from every table and so the only way you can place a bug is one that would also record everyone else's conversations... yeah, I'd say that's unfortunate (and pretty poor design on the owner's part), but the FBI has the right to place the bug they've got the warrant for, and if there's really no way to do that without it picking up other conversations then too bad.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by emhs on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @11:04AM (#6515430)
The nature of email is that the government's methods would simply collect all users' data, regardless of whether it was the target's or not. This would be true regardless of Lavabit being designed with user protection in mind or not, unless specialized methods such as those Levison offered to write were employed. Such methods would necessarily vary from provider to provider, because each provider is set up differently. The government simply defaults to massive collection in all cases so they don't have to write that or pay someone to write it. He offered to give them a means to get only the data they asked for, but they turned that down.
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by stonemetal on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @10:15AM (#6515070)
It's also always been legal to say "sorry, we never record any of that information"

Only if it is true. He has the data, the article says he has worked with law enforcement before in a kiddie porn case.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by smoyer on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @10:05AM (#6514984)
CALEA requires that all telephone companies (and now mobile phone and cable companies) provide a means of "tapping" a phone line. To my knowledge, there's nothing similar that says a data service has to provide the ability to retrieve unencrypted data.
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by SideburnsOfDoom on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @10:30AM (#6515186)
What they required was more like the means to tap all the phone lines simultaneously.
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by ipsin on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @11:56AM (#6515810)
See Section 216 of the Patriot Act, which throws in the ability to get "pen register" information (metadata) from Internet communications.

http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/add_myths.htm#s216

Yet another reason to repeal the "Patriot" Act.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by gaadd33 on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @01:49PM (#6516558)
Wouldn't metadata in this case be like "Ip X connected at Y and transferred Z bytes"? Similar to what a pen register produces with a phone call.
Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by anologwintermut on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @09:50AM (#6514838)
Lavabit had no such guarantees. First, the court order was for meta-data which wasn't encrypted. Second, encryption was done server side, so they did have access to the data the government requested.

The judge wasn't talking about end-to-end encryption. They were talking about Lavabit's assertion that it was difficult to get the data they admitted to having.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by fennecfoxen on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @01:38PM (#6516478)
You say "Lavabit had no such guarantees."

Without me arguing one way or another whether that's true -- do you think if they had better guarantees, that anything would be different here? That the government would say "oh no, we'll back down now"?

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by betterunix on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @01:45PM (#6516530)
Suppose that Lavabit sold smart cards for end-to-end encryption, and as a service would store ciphertexts for you. The government shows up with a warrant, Lavabit says, "Sorry, we cannot comply because we cannot access secret keys or decrypt messages by some other means." What exactly does the government do after that?

The point is that Lavabit's architecture did not resist these kinds of demands at all. At best all Lavabit could do is protect your mail until you log in.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by fennecfoxen on Tuesday October 08, 2013 @06:01PM (#6518107)
So here's a hypothetical for you. Suppose we build an architecture which you feel is more secure. Then the NSA people say "we have analyzed it, and there's a theoretical information leak. because that information leak exists you have to install our software which will exploit it. but if you'd designed your system better you would have been okay. also, incidentally, you're now legally forbidden from fixing this leak."

Then the legal obligations of the architecture are primary determined by the effectiveness of your security architecture; the existence of defects in the architecture which would preserve security in the absence of their exploitation is the thing matters to the court system.

That sounds tantamount to what you're proposing; is that really the sort of legal framework you think we have / should have? I personally think it's ridiculous, and I reject your justification and others which rely on a technical deficiency in Lavabit's implementation to endorse the legality and moral authority of the court's orders.

Re:How Lavabit Melted Down by betterunix on Wednesday October 09, 2013 @12:12AM (#6519349)
"Suppose we build an architecture which you feel is more secure. Then the NSA people say "we have analyzed it, and there's a theoretical information leak. because that information leak exists you have to install our software which will exploit it. but if you'd designed your system better you would have been okay. also, incidentally, you're now legally forbidden from fixing this leak.""

One of the features of a good security system is that there is no single party that can be compromised in a way that violates everyone's security. Basically, your example assumes that the system has a fundamentally risky design.

Even if you need a trusted party in your design, it should be the case that the party only has a limited ability to violate everyone's security. For example, consider an identity-based encryption system, which by its nature requires a trusted party to generate keys. Under the right circumstances, that party can delete the master secret key needed to generate keys; one can imagine setting things up so that the master secret is destroyed periodically, say once per month, so that only keys that were recently issued can be compromised if the authority is compromised (your identity under such a system might include some information about when your key was issued).

"I reject your justification and others which rely on a technical deficiency in Lavabit's implementation to endorse the legality and moral authority of the court's orders."

I think it would be fantastic to have a trustworthy government, but that is orthogonal to the issue here, because the security of a system like Lavabit is not limited to resisting court orders. Suppose the Lavabit have become as big as GMail i.e. big enough that the government might threaten an antitrust investigation if special favors were not performed. Suppose that a foreign government was trying to conduct industrial espionage against Lavabit's users, and surreptitiously installed eavesdropping software or equipment.

For that matter, suppose that you were personally involved in a lawsuit against Ladar. Would you communicate with your lawyer using Lavabit in that situation?

Also consider the reality that laws can change. It might take a massive terrorist attack to cause laws to change for the worse. Maybe a dictator will rise to power. Maybe people will just stop caring. Maybe it will be a combination of things, but the point is that building a system that relies on the law to protect users' rights is a fundamentally bad approach. It was not merely laws that stopped mass surveillance previously; when letters were sent primarily via the postal system, it was the lack of abundant and automatic copying that prevented mass surveillance. Laws are easy to change; widely deployed and widely used technologies are much harder to change (at least in ways that conform to the desires of politicians and governments).