No, you can't; the courts don't issue warrants like that. They'd issue a warrant for that information for one particular patron whom they already had reasonable suspicion of.
If the FBI have a warrant to put a bug on one regular's table, that doesn't seem unreasonable. If the bartender's carefully built the bar so that you can hear every conversation from every table and so the only way you can place a bug is one that would also record everyone else's conversations... yeah, I'd say that's unfortunate (and pretty poor design on the owner's part), but the FBI has the right to place the bug they've got the warrant for, and if there's really no way to do that without it picking up other conversations then too bad.
Only if it is true. He has the data, the article says he has worked with law enforcement before in a kiddie porn case.
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/subs/add_myths.htm#s216
Yet another reason to repeal the "Patriot" Act.
The judge wasn't talking about end-to-end encryption. They were talking about Lavabit's assertion that it was difficult to get the data they admitted to having.
Without me arguing one way or another whether that's true -- do you think if they had better guarantees, that anything would be different here? That the government would say "oh no, we'll back down now"?
The point is that Lavabit's architecture did not resist these kinds of demands at all. At best all Lavabit could do is protect your mail until you log in.
Then the legal obligations of the architecture are primary determined by the effectiveness of your security architecture; the existence of defects in the architecture which would preserve security in the absence of their exploitation is the thing matters to the court system.
That sounds tantamount to what you're proposing; is that really the sort of legal framework you think we have / should have? I personally think it's ridiculous, and I reject your justification and others which rely on a technical deficiency in Lavabit's implementation to endorse the legality and moral authority of the court's orders.
One of the features of a good security system is that there is no single party that can be compromised in a way that violates everyone's security. Basically, your example assumes that the system has a fundamentally risky design.
Even if you need a trusted party in your design, it should be the case that the party only has a limited ability to violate everyone's security. For example, consider an identity-based encryption system, which by its nature requires a trusted party to generate keys. Under the right circumstances, that party can delete the master secret key needed to generate keys; one can imagine setting things up so that the master secret is destroyed periodically, say once per month, so that only keys that were recently issued can be compromised if the authority is compromised (your identity under such a system might include some information about when your key was issued).
"I reject your justification and others which rely on a technical deficiency in Lavabit's implementation to endorse the legality and moral authority of the court's orders."
I think it would be fantastic to have a trustworthy government, but that is orthogonal to the issue here, because the security of a system like Lavabit is not limited to resisting court orders. Suppose the Lavabit have become as big as GMail i.e. big enough that the government might threaten an antitrust investigation if special favors were not performed. Suppose that a foreign government was trying to conduct industrial espionage against Lavabit's users, and surreptitiously installed eavesdropping software or equipment.
For that matter, suppose that you were personally involved in a lawsuit against Ladar. Would you communicate with your lawyer using Lavabit in that situation?
Also consider the reality that laws can change. It might take a massive terrorist attack to cause laws to change for the worse. Maybe a dictator will rise to power. Maybe people will just stop caring. Maybe it will be a combination of things, but the point is that building a system that relies on the law to protect users' rights is a fundamentally bad approach. It was not merely laws that stopped mass surveillance previously; when letters were sent primarily via the postal system, it was the lack of abundant and automatic copying that prevented mass surveillance. Laws are easy to change; widely deployed and widely used technologies are much harder to change (at least in ways that conform to the desires of politicians and governments).
That's true, but they're still essentially implying that services which are explicitly designed to omit backdoor capabilities for the government to spy on you -- that is, services offering actual cryptographically guaranteed privacy, not just "no one has looked yet, and if they did, it'll all turn out okay in the end trust us" -- are broadly illegal and will get you criminal contempt.