So basically, due to design decisions, the only way for the government to get access to the data they are entitled to, was to hand over the master private key. If lavabit had designed in such a way as to have one key per customer, then the government would have only been legally able to request the single key for that customer.
I'm not saying that lavabit should have had an SSL cert per customer, just that the designed in a way which didn't mesh well with US law and they paid the price.
Yes it was. Access to everything _for that user_. Which they are explicitly allowed to request with a warrant (which they had) under US law. Just because Lavabit could not provide the information for that user without giving away everyone eles's information does not mean that the government can't have the information for that one user.
Per the wired article, the government asserts that “The representative of Lavabit indicated that Lavabit had the technical capability to decrypt the information, but that Lavabit did not want to ‘defeat [its] own system,’"
Itis only after Lavabit refused to just decrypt Snowden's email, that the FBI demanded everything and the judge makes that assertion.
Of course, the Wired article might be wrong. However, I cannot think of a single legitimate technical reason why Lavabit could not break their own encryption for a single use. The encryption and decryption was done server side. This means they can pull the key out of memory. Worst case, they can grab Snowden's password/key when it goes to the server.
[0] http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed/