Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by anologwintermut on Sunday September 08, 2013 @04:59PM
(#6350310)
Two technical notes:
1) AES CTR needs a nonce (number used once) not an IV. So a maximal LFSR works up until it repeats. People call it an IV, but strictly speaking IV's need to also be random.
2) I have no idea if you need the replays in a very specific order or not. If you know the m being decrypted, then you always get the IVs. I suspect if given random parts of the output sequence of an LSFRs and the distances between them, it's still easy to recover the seed.
Strong agree on the distinction between IVs and nonces (I wrote about them in a blog post recently and the confusion annoys me too).
Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by anologwintermut on Sunday September 08, 2013 @04:36PM
(#6350205)
Oh, to be clear, I don't think the NSA back doored the standard that way. I think the IETF was just doing what they do: ignoring principled cryptographic design because they thought they knew better. Hence why I made the point about the incorrect design philosophy. It happens to be the case that this kind if philosophy is also easy to subvert if someone is malicious. I don't think that's what happened in this case.
An LFSR system may not an explicit backdoor, but it's piling pointless complexity upon general confusion by well-intentioned people who were apparently being manipulated and misdiredcted.
We have no idea if they were being manipulated. The NSA of 1998 is not the same organization as the NSA of 2013.
I don't think LFSR CBC IVs are a good idea (though again note that they work in CTR), but they seem like an awfully dumb way to backdoor a standard, and it's straightforward to see how a well-intentioned suggestion could propose their introduction.