Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by tptacek on Sunday September 08, 2013 @12:14PM
(#6349182)
Rogaway didn't publish academically. He commented on the mailing list, and a bunch of standards group denizens pooped all over him. The same thing happened to Dan Bernstein on namedroppers. Is Perry Metzger an NSA agent? I have reason to doubt it.
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http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/draft-rogaway-ipse... If you could provide some more information on responses, perhaps emails dismissing it, I think we can figure out what went wrong.
What went wrong with IPSEC was that a bunch of standards group people set out to build a crypto standard that would impact every networking vendor on the planet, and did so with frank and open hostility towards academic cryptographers. The idea that NSA would have tried to subvert IETF implies that IETF was organized enough to subvert. But it wasn't and isn't. IETF is like the Internet's student council.
Lots of smart people have involved themselves with IETF, but those among them that I have talked to about it seem universally and profoundly frustrated by the whole process.
Could this hostility be the result of the NSA subversion? It seems as though the same few hardware vendors keep popping up as the people slowing down security fixes.
No, I don't think so.
Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by anologwintermut on Sunday September 08, 2013 @01:13PM
(#6349368)
Is the argument whether using either of the proposed IV generation modes is wrong or if it was do to NSA tampering? It certainly is wrong to do so (and should have been known to be wrong by the time of Rogaway's comment).
I don't believe it was broadly known to be wrong during IPSEC standardization.
Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by anologwintermut on Sunday September 08, 2013 @02:41PM
(#6349746)
Is that true for the LFSR proposal?I thought LFSRs were basically never thought to be cryptographically secure.
I don't know the specific proposal, but I know how CBC designs with LFSR-generated IVs work, and why you'd want a deterministic generator for your IVs, and it's because it allows both sides to agree on a non-repeating progression of IVs without actually sending the extra block on every message.
LFSRs are also sometimes used in counter mode, too.
Again: obviously, a simple LFSR isn't cryptographically secure, and anyone who would deploy one in a cryptosystem probably already knows that. The question is: how are you mounting the attack you're talking about?
Re:Speculation on "BULLRUN"
by anologwintermut on Sunday September 08, 2013 @04:41PM
(#6350226)
Do you know of protocols that use LFSRs for IV generations of cryptographic purposes? Can you link to them ? I'd like to see if they are breakable.
I've got nothing I can cite to you; it's also true that a lot of bespoke crypto enjoys a lack of usable attacker chosen plaintext, which is admittedly not a good property to rely on for a standard.