Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered by Browsers

Re:Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered b... by bsullivan01 on Sunday September 08, 2013 @09:20AM (#6348606)

Beware of random cryptographers bearing suggestions? #HUMINT

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Re:Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered b... by jwr on Sunday September 08, 2013 @01:34PM (#6349443)

I really hope TLS crypto standards won't be set (or changes rejected) based on who proposed a particular change.

Changes should stand on their own merits. I don't see why we should trust anyone, random or not. It's not about trusting people, it's about trusting algorithms. So it doesn't really matter who in particular proposes changes.

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Re:Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered b... by bsullivan01 on Sunday September 08, 2013 @02:23PM (#6349652)

In a ideal world, but if you get a lot of "contributions" some might slip through. Remember, no one can match NSA's budget, manpower and maybe brainpower.

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Re:Proposal to Change the Default TLS Ciphersuites Offered b... by ott2 on Sunday September 08, 2013 @09:43AM (#6348659)

Some of the OpenSSH and IETF mailing list archives about SSH also make interesting reading. Exactly why does RFC 4253 mandate Group 1 and Group 14 as the only required key exchange mechanisms? (They were defined by RFC 2412, written by someone who was "assigned to the DARPA Information Technology Office".) However, perhaps it would be better to fork a separate thread for such speculations.

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