ott2
ott2 on Hacker News
Thanks for a sensible explanation about the possible rationale of the actors. Perhaps a different way to distil your point: the film industry is stuck in a particular local optimum, and one needs to take into account the position of the actors when assessing their actions.
Your first point is false -- in some countries bauxite is processed with power from coal-fired plants. Your other points seem valid.
Since you claim not to be a statistician, pardon me if I also ignore your unsubstantiated opinion that the null hypothesis was "so shitty that they practically guaranteed p<.05".
The takeaway of the article seems to be: when fighting limited-liability companies, being irrational is a good tactic. It is sad if guerilla warfare is the only option left when fighting corporate actions one disagrees with.
Worryingly accurate metaphor: Unix is Christianity, complete with Linus as Luther.
TL;DR: the "creativity" label has been grabbed by the ruling classes to justify their own social position, and has little to do with what used to be called creativity. (This may be an interesting insight, but I'm not sure this argument is well supported by the article.)
You cannot know whether the date the content was published will be relevant for a reader or not. It is not your assessment of timeliness that matters, but the reader's. So in the interest of doing the right thing, don't obscure the date.
Your summary is worth a thousand web sites.
Check the date -- the proposal is a month old. So Bruce Schneier's comments may be relevant, but one can't really accuse Brian Smith of ignoring them.
Some of the OpenSSH and IETF mailing list archives about SSH also make interesting reading. Exactly why does RFC 4253 mandate Group 1 and Group 14 as the only required key exchange mechanisms? (They were defined by RFC 2412, written by someone who was "assigned to the DARPA Information Technology Office".) However, perhaps it would be better to fork a separate thread for such speculations.
So, Mr Smith wants to add a bunch of elliptic curve options (using the NIST curves, weakest P-256 first), while removing the widely used TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 due to "concerns" about "performance" and an unsubstantiated argument that ephemeral key exchange is somehow always better. Hmm.
As with any juicy enough collection of data, the relevant question is not "what if an adversary gains access" but "when".
This is completely unmotivated. The author seems to conflate running a DNS server that is authoritative-only with running a server that handles recursive queries.
It is a bad idea running a server running recursive queries blindly: as the example shows, running an unmonitored recursive server tends to result in the server being used as a reflector for DDoS attacks. It is also opens the door for the server's cache to be poisoned by false DNS data. Running a recursive DNS server well is hard.
On the other hand, it is a good idea running one's own server, authoritative for one's own domains, but which refuses recursive queries. This stops others having control over when and how you can transfer your domains, what kinds of records you can add, or how often and when you can update the configuration of your services.
It is worth learning the difference.
The second main point: with declining volatility, there is less space for HFT strategies to profit.
What I didn't see in the article was an explicit discussion of transaction costs. Transaction tax would increase those costs, but was part of the decline because transaction costs have already gone up?
Another key point: "the SEC is sharing information with the FBI to probe manipulative trading practices by some HFT firms" and now has the infrastructure to detect anomalies.
So if metadata is somehow distinct and separate from what it describes, does this mean that the shutdown of sites pointing to copyright-infringing content will stop?
Posted by
ott2 on Tuesday August 21, 2012 @03:54AM
from the wired.com dept.
Search for constraint programming solutions to "nurse rostering" problems.
The sensible treatment of a "secret question" is as a second password. Since it acts in parallel with the password, like a second door to your house, it should be at least as hard to guess as the "main" password.
I would go further than saying that this is obsolete: it is simply bad security design.
Posted by
ott2 on Saturday March 17, 2012 @07:51AM
from the kickstarter.com dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Monday February 13, 2012 @10:41AM
from the macrumors.com dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Tuesday December 20, 2011 @02:22PM
from the necsi.edu dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Thursday December 15, 2011 @10:15AM
from the arxiv.org dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Sunday December 11, 2011 @05:30AM
from the shaunagm.net dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Tuesday December 06, 2011 @02:20PM
from the blogs.reuters.com dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Tuesday December 06, 2011 @09:35AM
from the necsi.edu dept.
Posted by
ott2 on Wednesday November 16, 2011 @06:15AM
from the isc.org dept.