The NSA's (authorized) budget is $10.8 billion[1]. For $5 you can get a server with 20GB SSD and 1TB of transfer per month. It doesn't seem like it'd take very much money to be able to ensure that at least, say, 1% of Tor users' traffic passes through your entry and exit nodes, de-anonymizing them. So over a long enough time scale, that would de-anonymize quite a lot of interesting traffic, and interesting users.
One solution is VPN over Tor. But the NSA claims they've cracked 30 VPN providers, and are focused on cracking the rest as soon as possible. That's a lot of compromised VPN providers.
You could set up your own server and use that as a VPN, but if you pay with Bitcoin, then it's trivial to analyze the blockchain to tie your identity to the server, unless you use a tumbling service like bitcoinfog. But even if you manage to get a server set up anonymously, then what? You still would want to use VPN over Tor, since that's your best bet for privacy. But as soon as you get de-anonymized on Tor, that correlates your home IP address with your anonymous server, thus de-anonymizing your server too.
I can't think of any options to be truly safe from a global passive adversary that doesn't also cost >1MM to set up initially. Any ideas?
[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/black-...
Which could be run by the NSA...
It's turtles all of the way down.
Is that really a common assumption? I would expect that most people assume otherwise. Surely anybody informed knows that at least many, if not most, exit nodes are "hostile".
Leave a raspberrypi hidden near an open wifi spot and connect into it and route traffic through it? That would still require us to connect to their network from another one...
Buy a cheap (preferably stolen) smartphone on craigslist and throw away the SIM card. Preferably this should be a phone with a removable battery. Walk to a bus stop that is near to a starbucks and jump onto their wifi with the phone, pretending to wait for the bus. After a while, walk away. Since you are outside during the entire process you can do this during winter and bundle up, concealing your identity while not looking suspicious.
Using a laptop at a busstop would draw attention. Using a cantenna anywhere not private would also draw attention. Getting a private place to use the cantenna is prone to problems (you could aim it out your apartment window, but that ties you to a location. You could park a van nearby, but that is suspicious). You can easily dispose of the smartphone later; just microwave it then go for a nature walk and throw it in the river.
What is the cryptome document for prosectors that you refer to?
http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013.pdf
http://cryptome.org/2013/09/computer-forensics-2013-hoax.pdf
That's a pretty obvious hoax, detective "Stu Pitt" and "Laughlin Foo". It's good that it was quickly labelled as such.
All people are doing is applying the same logic and standards governments and spy agencies do. Is there any evidence that the WHOLE of the US and rest of the planet's public are traitors and terrorists? No. But they could be, right? Best not take a chance, right? "We" can do it, it is possible, so "they might be doing it. And so on.
So, the NSA can or could compromise tor nodes, we know it is possible, so why take the risk? Especially if you are, say, Snowden or a freedom advocate.
It's probably good to insist on sources. I should've provided one originally anyway: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet...
1. VPNs using PPTP
2. VPNs using OpenVPN
1) should not be used anymore, it is more vulnerable by design (intercept the initial handshake and you're set; the NSA slides referred to a feature "Show VPN startups", which is probably what they meant by that).
So my guess is that when the say "we've cracked VPNs", it's probably PPTP VPNs, but then again, nobody knows for sure.
Couldn't we design a system that doesn't fall in this scenario, by using a constant-rate packet-blasting network that emits "background radiation" even if nothing is happening, and then filters out the good stuff via chaffing/winnowing [1]? This would clog the tubes like a torrent and run you a similar tab, but wouldn't it be 100% anonymous even in the face of such an adversary, while still being low-latency?
From the original paper by the Tor developers:
"A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong adversary." --- Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a465464.pdf