From the article: "Intelligence officials asked The Times and ProPublica not to publish this article, saying that it might prompt foreign targets to switch to new forms of encryption or communications that would be harder to collect or read."
Also: “Properly implemented strong crypto systems are one of the few things that you can rely on,” - Snowden
I would assume that because Snowden used Lavabit & they shut down that the NSA took issue with how secure Lavabit actually was.
Do you know who your covert agents are?
Go ahead, call the cops and media. I hope you have a ton of money on hand and some jewelry stashed away in various locations before you do so.
Undercover agents at all levels of law enforcement commit apparently criminal acts every day, with no fear of prosecution. There's no reason for this to be any different.
It's not like they've just gotten secret keys. They've specifically gotten chip manufacturers to add backdoors to hardware, as well as significantly influenced actual cryptography standards themselves:
> "The N.S.A. wrote the standard and aggressively pushed it on the international group, privately calling the effort “a challenge in finesse.”
> “Eventually, N.S.A. became the sole editor,” the memo says.
Could someone add a backdoor to git that hides backdoors from showing up in git? Could gcc be backdoored to add backdoors to arbitrary software? How likely is it that NSA has a few zero-days lying around they could use to hack into the servers that host git or gcc or any other tool you rely on? What if they had agents among the committers and maintainers of these projects?
Security against a well-armed, well-funded, well-organized, secretive adversary is hard.
This, however, is not a decidable problem. It is possible to construct a program that will fool the worm and thus you can create a compiler that you know you can trust for this test. It will probably be a hard compiler to use, but you will need it at most twice -- once to check for an attack, and if there is an attack once more to bootstrap a clean compiler.
i.e., you actually have to have an example of a compromised compiler, which pretty much solves the problem in the first place.
If you decidedly don't-trust the only compiler on your system, and don't trust outside sources, the only solution is to hand-assemble a new compiler on the system, and hope that at least the hardware is trustworthy. which it isn't, necessarily.
You can't rely on a backdoor looking like this:
if(!strcmp(username, "secretagentman")) { … }Anything in the leaked docs on that particular incident?
Perhaps I lack the wherewithal to identify security vulnerabilities in deployed code, but there's a good chance that there are others who are able to spot said vulns.
I'm talking about vulnerabilities in crypto software no in email clients, browsers or office software (that probably they use too)
Nobody seems to know if the NSA actually has practical attacks against primitives like AES or SHA-2. We do know for sure that they go after higher level implementation flaws. The more complex your encryption scheme is, the more likely it is that you'll introduce a grave flaw. It only takes one.
I'd suggest that our best bet already exists: NaCl[1]. It's by Daniel Fucking Bernstein, so the implementation is as flawless as it gets. Better yet, it doesn't use a single US-approved primitive (not even the NIST curves Schneier was warning against in his Guardian piece).
Funnily, before the leaks Bernstein's use of all his own primitives was seen as a bit wacky and concerning, but now it seems almost sensible.
[1]: http://nacl.cr.yp.to
The reason we don't do that is, of course, CPU cost.
working with chipmakers to insert back doors
So you're going to need to make your own chips, too.
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sps32/sec_news.html#Backdoor
> Abstract. This paper is a short summary of the first real world detection of a backdoor in a military grade FPGA. [....] The backdoor was found to exist on the silicon itself, it was not present in any firmware loaded onto the chip. [....]
That's the money quote there- the NSA hasn't cracked encryption. They've just put back doors in.
And we can't even be that angry at the (e.g.) Microsoft execs that authorise the back doors- they potentially face jail time if they resist NSA requests. All the while presumably not able to talk about the requests publicly.
EDIT: and the really fun part - did you know the former head of the NSA serves on the board of directors for Motorola Solutions? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Hayden_(general)