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Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by gaius on Thursday September 05, 2013 @03:42PM (#6336443)
That's a false sense of security. You can inspect every line of code in SSL but unless you are a world-class cryptographer yourself, how will you spot a backdoor in the algorithm?
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by electic on Thursday September 05, 2013 @03:47PM (#6336470)
It's a bit harder to sneak in junk in open source projects. You can see the checkins. However, you are right, if the flaw is in the algorithm itself, it's hopeless.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by jorgeortiz85 on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:03PM (#6336568)
Is it harder to sneak in junk in open source projects? I'm reminded of Ken Thompson's Turing Award lecture, "Reflections on Trusting Trust". http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Could someone add a backdoor to git that hides backdoors from showing up in git? Could gcc be backdoored to add backdoors to arbitrary software? How likely is it that NSA has a few zero-days lying around they could use to hack into the servers that host git or gcc or any other tool you rely on? What if they had agents among the committers and maintainers of these projects?

Security against a well-armed, well-funded, well-organized, secretive adversary is hard.

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by hyperpape on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:31PM (#6336726)
There are countermeasures concerning the Trusting Trust attack: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/countering_tru..., though I'm not sure if anyone has ever seriously attempted to deploy them.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by betterunix on Thursday September 05, 2013 @05:38PM (#6337239)
I have given some thought to this kind of thing, and one thing I realized is that the limits of the trusting trust attack can be exploited as well. Let's support you only have one compiler. Now, it is going to try to insert the worm into any compiler it compiles, right? The problem is that it must be able to detect that it is actually compiling a compiler.

This, however, is not a decidable problem. It is possible to construct a program that will fool the worm and thus you can create a compiler that you know you can trust for this test. It will probably be a hard compiler to use, but you will need it at most twice -- once to check for an attack, and if there is an attack once more to bootstrap a clean compiler.

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by Yen on Thursday September 05, 2013 @07:33PM (#6337836)
But in order to create a disguised compiler, you need to know what method a compromised system uses to decide whether something is a compiler.

i.e., you actually have to have an example of a compromised compiler, which pretty much solves the problem in the first place.

If you decidedly don't-trust the only compiler on your system, and don't trust outside sources, the only solution is to hand-assemble a new compiler on the system, and hope that at least the hardware is trustworthy. which it isn't, necessarily.

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by regularfry on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:31PM (#6336732)
Could you spot a "trusting-trust"-style backdoor in an FPGA you were offloading crypto to? How would you even start?
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by LnxPrgr3 on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:42PM (#6336809)
http://underhanded.xcott.com/ <-- a contest all about sneaking bad behavior into code without being noticed

You can't rely on a backdoor looking like this:

    if(!strcmp(username, "secretagentman")) { … }
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by Ergomane on Friday September 06, 2013 @05:13AM (#6339418)
The Debian OpenSSL snafu showed that even rather blatant changes get missed.

Anything in the leaked docs on that particular incident?

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by XorNot on Friday September 06, 2013 @06:35AM (#6339619)
The OpenSSL snafu showed us all that _code commenting_ is a really good idea.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by D9u on Thursday September 05, 2013 @03:59PM (#6336545)
The strength of open source lies in the number of eyes with access to the code.

Perhaps I lack the wherewithal to identify security vulnerabilities in deployed code, but there's a good chance that there are others who are able to spot said vulns.

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by gaius on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:10PM (#6336612)
Actually, we don't know if there's a good chance or not. All the best cryptographers in the world, who aren't already working for intelligence agencies, are reliant on government funding (i.e. they're in academia). The fact that these have gone undiscovered so long suggests that finding them will not be trivial.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by aioprisan on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:13PM (#6336626)
ability to spot algorithmic vulnerabilities on that level? and doing it for free? the chances are nill
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by singold on Thursday September 05, 2013 @06:49PM (#6337626)
Not completly for free if you use that software, and if you are an expert crytpo guy, it is probable that you use that software.

I'm talking about vulnerabilities in crypto software no in email clients, browsers or office software (that probably they use too)

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by njharman on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:54PM (#6336898)
Your statement reveals a real lack of understanding of opensource. Hint; it's open to all, all includes world-class cryptographers. Each contributes their ability for the greater good of all. WCC may not spend their time coding or packaging or whatever. Others will.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by gaius on Thursday September 05, 2013 @05:16PM (#6337069)
No, I'm afraid it is you who are mistaken... About a great many things.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by wiml on Sunday September 08, 2013 @07:50PM (#6351060)
Now, witness the power of my fully operational Utah data center.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by mikeash on Thursday September 05, 2013 @04:45PM (#6336830)
Can we combine multiple algorithms such that having any one of them be secure is safe? For example, instead of encrypting with just RSA, do one pass with RSA and then another pass with ECC. Instead of just using AES, do one pass with AES, another pass with Twofish, and a third pass with RC4. Does that actually help?
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by alextgordon on Thursday September 05, 2013 @05:38PM (#6337240)
You can do this but it will probably make it less secure, not more.

Nobody seems to know if the NSA actually has practical attacks against primitives like AES or SHA-2. We do know for sure that they go after higher level implementation flaws. The more complex your encryption scheme is, the more likely it is that you'll introduce a grave flaw. It only takes one.

I'd suggest that our best bet already exists: NaCl[1]. It's by Daniel Fucking Bernstein, so the implementation is as flawless as it gets. Better yet, it doesn't use a single US-approved primitive (not even the NIST curves Schneier was warning against in his Guardian piece).

Funnily, before the leaks Bernstein's use of all his own primitives was seen as a bit wacky and concerning, but now it seems almost sensible.

[1]: http://nacl.cr.yp.to

Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by meowface on Thursday September 05, 2013 @06:32PM (#6337549)
DJB has always been laughed off as an eccentric paranoiac, and yet as the years go by he almost always ends up being proven right. It's been kind of a funny pattern over the past few decades.
Re:N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption by Filligree on Thursday September 05, 2013 @05:21PM (#6337109)
Yes, though there are some subtleties, it's fairly straightforward overall.

The reason we don't do that is, of course, CPU cost.