Take for instance the Skipjack cipher (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Skipjack_(cipher)), a Type I cipher ("endorsed by the NSA for securing classified and sensitive U.S. Government information") which was evaluated, for the purpose of security, by "some of the world's most accomplished and famous experts in combinatorics and abstract algebra", and finally declassified due to concerns expressed by other cryptographers about its security.
Biham and Shamir broke it the day after it was declassified.
In cryptography, if you break 1 bit, you've broken it. No excuse.
Skipjack was designed using building blocks and
techniques that date back more than forty years.
I think it's safe to assume they have much stronger stuff now.So it basically comes down to whether or not we 'assume our enemies are advancing their own tech at roughly the same rate.' The NSA probably has an okay idea of what 'roughly' is, and if you had this ability you wouldn't be showing your hand lightly.
Way more speculatively, I'd be curious to know whether or not it would be possible to add 'next-gen' crypto to existing practices in such a way that it might be transparent?
If you check some scientific breakthroughs during the Cold War they were very close on the both sides in the matter of months.
Also with 5% of the world population NSA have limited talent pool. Assuming you are first to the goal in that case is ... overly confident. (Even if we correct for a lot of people that are not easy to tap in the outside populations chances are not on the NSA side). And I am sure a lot of the messages in other countries communications are fake and testing just to see if someone is snooping.
EDIT: To your latter point, some people would consider this to be a telling fact.
Perhaps they were simply anticipating DLP progress and wanted to be future-proof?
Suite B aims for 128-bit or 192-bit security levels; for comparison 1024-bit modulus RSA is currently thought to provide 73-bit security.
(The next natural question is why the internet community is still failing to widely deploy cryptosystems with appropriate security levels. I don't know. But HTTPS, OTR and DNSSEC are all built of cheese in this respect.)
I agree with your point, but do you think they'd force widespread cipher switch across government bodies? Or leave other government entities using broken encryption so they can more easiler spy?
But now every plane spotter has instant cross-correlation with every other one - and those secret flights stand out as being, well, private flights.
So long story short, if I did magically invent quantum computing, I would let the rest of the low grade secrets go hang. One of the 3 million (!) security cleared US personnel will throw Assange a copy soon enough - so lets use the advantage, to our advantage.
This of course means that if our security services have the brains and the political muscle, they will need to choose themselves which are the truly secret things and arrange a government in a government to keep it in shape. That's not likely to be a good thing.
you only notice once they call upon the more public parts of gov to switch to another 'secure' algo. also, NSA themselves probably use the Suite A algos that we know batshit about.
but, reality check: THIS IS ALL SPECULATION. there is no evidence that they have broken anything.
In other words: if the NSA break one of these "public" algorithms, you'll be able to tell; they'll soon be picking new Suite B ciphers. (There will be a time-delay, but not of the intentional "let's capture+break foreign transmissions before scaring them away from this cipher" kind. Re-securing our own transmissions takes priority, always. Even if it was broken because of some "quantum leap"--pardon the pun--we have to assume our enemies are advancing their own tech at roughly the same rate, so if we can crack it, they can too.)