One estimate I found was that there 150 million iPhone 5's shipped in the first year, and each one was about 25 GFlops. If 1% of that CPU was spent encrypting & decrypting communications to and from the iPhones, that is about 37,500 TFlops, which is just over the Rmax listed for the top supercomputer, Tianhe-2. Some numbers for the cost of that supercomputer are around $100 million, but the estimated cost for the Xeon Phis alone could be as high as $250 million. Giving the defenders the advantage, let's round up to $1 billion.
So the NSA needs to spend $1 billion per year to counteract the top smartphone in the world. Their budget is estimated to be as high as $10 billion / year, so they could do it. But how much of the total pie are iPhone 5's? I think to be competitive we need to push the cost to the NSA up towards $30 or $100 billion per year. $1 billion is trivial, $10 billion Congress will swallow and move on. They still fund NASA to the tune of $16 billion, and no one in Congress even cares about NASA anymore. But $100 billion per year, then you're talking real money.
So what fraction of total personal computer sales are iPhone 5's? If they're 10%, we'll be hard-pressed to keep the NSA out of the game. If they're 1% of personal computer sales, I think we have a chance of keeping ahead of them.
Imagine what we could spend on an actual threat.
That's not to say we couldn't or wouldn't spend in excess of $100 billion per year on a boondoggle. We've done it before and we'll do it again. But I think $100 billion is the point at which money even becomes an issue. $1 or $10 billion and there's barely a point in trying.
Targeted individual surveillance will likely always be possible (not just because of encryption, but because of the 5$ wrench, trojans and so on). What we need is to make global, indiscriminate and realtime surveillance computationally unfeasible.
Three years from now, most commercially-sensitive, politically-embarrassing, or otherwise-newsworthy material, will likely be obsolete.
We're not winning the war on drugs, but there is no indication of giving up on it at the federal level. Law enforcement spending is not slowing down.
I was thinking more of the USSR. There didn't seem to be any amount of money we weren't willing to spend. Lives, yes, but not money.
Unless you are speaking in some kind of figurative sense where I'm missing the metaphor, this isn't really true. The few real wars of attrition where the US has been on the winning side (WWI comes to mind) it "won" by joining late when the other side (as well as its allies) had already suffered considerable attrition. But even in those circumstances, its record in wars of attrition isn't that great (the US portion of the extended colonial conflict in Indochina comes to mind.)
Imagine how much computing power the US fighter jet program's budget could buy.
There's only one successful way to fight this: change the culture and change the politics.
Technical approaches are fine for shielding you today. At the rate the police state is accelerating, it's very unlikely to shield you tomorrow, as they're going to outlaw the means of shielding. They will not allow an arms race, they'll use their legal powers to shut it down, and make you a criminal.
Not going to happen short of a mass global natural disaster or mass military takeover changing the stakes. There's too much power concentrated at the top and no good reason for the people there to surrender any of it. If the masses get too persistent, they will "cull" the masses through whatever means...
You'll need to make sure that those responsible to signing the updates are resistant to coercion. The best bet there is probably a moderately large number of somewhat anonymous signers. Have a large and diverse pool of signers and require every update to have some portion of the signers sign off on it before the releases are accepted. With any luck if doors start getting kicked in and signers start getting hit with wrenches, at least one of them will be able to warn the public.
And for 4 billion USD they could create their own foundry. And then costs begin to plummet once again.
The weird thing of course is that the work is completely 'useless'
We need to encrypt all communications expensively. Make algorithms which can be tuned to be arbitrarily expensive, computation-wise. Tune them so that it takes as much time as we can bear to encrypt and decrypt an email. Seconds, ideally.
The goal is to make it so that some large fraction of our computational resources are taken up encrypting and decrypting communications. Say, 10 or 20%. For every day uses this will just show up as emails being slow to open, since most people's computers are idle most of the time. But if your goal is to intercept and process all communications, all of the time, you can't do it without having an absurd level of computational resources at your disposal, even if you have all of the secret keys. Ten or twenty Google's worth of data centers.
If this was done properly, it would kill (free) webmail search. It wouldn't prevent targeted snooping, except insomuch as normal encryption does, but it could make pervasive snooping too expensive to be feasible.