Re:Google confirms Java and OpenSSL crypto PRNG on Android a...
by glurgh on Friday August 16, 2013 @04:53AM
(#6222882)
What's safer for developers, reading from /dev/urandom, or calling the platform CSPRNG when the platform CSPRNG does something other than reading from /dev/urandom?
I think you're right about this and the (rather fiddly and nerdy) point where we disagree is on where the line of abstraction lies. I don't think you have any business reading /dev/urandom any more than you have using, say, AES-NI
Re:Google confirms Java and OpenSSL crypto PRNG on Android a...
by tedunangst on Friday August 16, 2013 @01:51PM
(#6225592)
Nobody is going to miss the logic bug that causes the Linux kernel random number generator to not even try to seed itself.
Well, NetBSD more or less did that twice in a row earlier this year...
So here is the interesting question as I see it:
What's safer for developers, reading from /dev/urandom, or calling the platform CSPRNG when the platform CSPRNG does something other than reading from /dev/urandom?
I think the answer might be /dev/urandom. A Debian maintainer is not going to accidentally comment the randomness out of the Linux kernel CSPRNG. Nobody is going to miss the logic bug that causes the Linux kernel random number generator to not even try to seed itself.