Two observations along these lines, however:
* The B-52 originally was the US Air Force's all-purpose bomber when it rolled out in the 50s. It was a conventional heavy bomber, a strategic nuclear bomber, and a cruise missile platform all in one. Over time, however, the USAF's bombing roles have become split; the B-1 now takes on the role of a conventional bomber, while the B-2 is used for deep-penetration strikes and standoffs.
* One big hurdle in the development of a B-52 replacement is the limitations on the number of strategic bombers allowed under the New Start treaty. The US cannot easily develop new nuclear-capable bombers under this treaty, and thus must keep a chunk of the B-52 fleet around to maintain the nuclear capability.
Conceptually it fills the role of a very large drone.
What's really needed from a modern bomber is a high munition capacity, a large combat radius, and long loiter times. Cheap to build and operate would be great too. Super stealth as well as high speeds and maneuverability are simply expensive distractions.
For the rare situation where we need to deliver something like a conventional bunker buster deep inside of territory that we don't wish to first completely destroy the AA cababilities of first -- i.e. an Osirak type mission -- we still have 20 of those $2 billion B-2s.
The requirements of "high munition capacity, a large combat radius, and long loiter times" closely fit the description of a close air support role, which has been the primary role for bombers and strike aircraft in recent years (Iraq and Afghanistan).
With that said, there are certainly other roles for bombers; missions where strategic facilities, supply lines, and bases/defenses must be destroyed. These are rooted in more conventional warfare than we've seen recently, but I'm less than convinced that they would be rare in a major conflict.
These conventional missions demand speed and stealth not only to penetrate evade enemy air defenses, but also to keep up with intelligence on mobile/time-sensitive targets. This timely delivery problem is hard to accomplish with small numbers of loitering aircraft or where the target has advance warning.
Also, given the proliferation of advanced mobile SAM and radar systems, I'm unsure of the assumption that US aircraft will have clear skies in a future conflict. Certainly in the early days of any conflict this will be untrue, and those are the days where strategic bombing will be most valuable; disrupted enemy infrastructure allow ground forces to move without resistance.
Thus, I think there's a need for both roles--CAS and penetrating bomber--and it seems to me that the USAF is actually tackling these separately, efficiently. While the Reaper lacks a large payload, it seems that the large numbers providing spatial coverage will have sufficient munitions in aggregate. The B-2 was designed to be the penetrator.
Two legs is obviously less secure than three, and we don't have a fourth because we haven't developed a fourth technology for delivering nuclear weapons.
Those requirements make me thing of schemes where cruise missiles are dumped out the back of a C-130J Super Hercules for air-launch.
This seems an inadequate and/or overly-simplified explanation. The F-14 was a beast, far heavier than the F-35 or, for that matter, the A-6. And that was 1960s technology. Surely now we could build a capable, carrier-launched ground-attack craft with weight comparable to an F-14?
[1] Stevenson, James P. The $5 Billion Misunderstanding. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001. ISBN 1-55750-777-5.
(For that matter, there were the C-130 tests on a carrier, which was probably pushing the bounds of good sense, but it did work.)
I think you may have missed the B-1 and the enormous focus on UAVs by all of the branches.
I am optimistic about UAVs as a relatively inexpensive replacement for a lot of aircraft, but I fear that once their successes start to endanger the justifications for testosterone toys, internal factions within the military as well as politicians in the pockets of defense contractors will hit back hard.
We've virtually abandoned A and B line planes because the testosterone blinded fighter mafia in the airforce would rather have fun toys than useful equipment, and the navy is right there with them because heavy planes can't take off from aircraft carriers. It doesn't help that the one bomber the air force begrudgingly agreed to acquire is an obscenely expensive hanger queen, designed for nuclear bombing runs deep into the Soviet Union.
If the army wasn't barred from operating fixed wing aircraft by the pernicious Key West agreement, maybe they would operate as a voice of reason.
We should be working on a replacement for the AC-130 (1968), the A-10 (1977), and B-52 (1955!). To the extent we actually need more air superiority fighters they can bring back the F-22 line.