This played out in a very interesting way with DES. Most of the theories about an NSA conspiracy to weaken DES have been falsified. The changes to the s-box structure was later discovered to strengthen the cipher against a certain class of attacks. The small key size was later discovered to be right around the actual security level the cipher provides (larger key sizes would not have improved security by much).
In the case of public key crypto, one of the most important things we need is to know what parameter sizes to use. Cryptanalysis is critical to making such estimates, and once again the NSA's expertise comes in handy here. To put it another way, if you knew nothing about factoring integers, 1024 bit RSA keys would appear to be overkill -- the only reason key sizes have become so large is because of GNFS and similar developments.
In general you should avoid assuming that large, sprawling agencies like the NSA have a single goal. Yes the NSA conducts signals intelligence and would prefer that those signals not be encrypted. On the other hand the NSA also wants to ensure that foreign governments cannot spy on American government communications. With the vast reliance on contractors to develop software for sensitive systems there is a need for the NSA to make good recommendations to the public (even at the risk of improving our opponents' security); it is a classic NSA dilemma.
It's been awhile since I've studied DES, but I'm not aware of any sense in which the s-box changes weakened it.
According to Don Coppersmith, NSA picked DES's s-boxes by randomly generating them and choosing the ones that best resisted differential cryptanalysis --- again, this is something NSA did fifteen years before differential cryptanalysis was discovered by the public. They modified DES to resist an attack only they knew about.
Citation?
> It took the academic community two decades to figure out that the NSA "tweaks" actually improved the security of DES
http://news.cnet.com/Saluting-the-data-encryption-legacy/201...
>The small key size was later discovered to be right around the actual security level the cipher provides (larger key sizes would not have improved security by much).
I have never heard this claim before and without any source backing it up I am liable to doubt it.
Although I must have one final jab :)
>In general you should avoid assuming that large, sprawling agencies like the NSA have a single goal.
I don't think they actually have any goals, per se, other than their own perpetuation.
I'm just inherently suspicious of anything the NSA are in favour of, as their focus seems to be on breaking crypto, rather than recommending strong crypto - to recommend a key exchange mechanism that they can't snoop on seems to be a counterintuitive step.