Justin, can you tell us the real reason Chrome does it this way? Because the reasons you list so far don't make sense.
If you don't want people browsing your passwords, you can't ever give them access to your user account or your unlocked desktop. That's it, that is the entire solution. Any other method of protecting the passwords is vulnerable as long as the potential attacker has physical access to the unlocked desktop.
Now, perhaps some of this is mitigated by the fact that most of those friends, coworkers, significant others won't know how to install a keylogger or install extensions - but some small percentage will anyway, and those users who were lulled into a false sense of security will have been just as exploited anyway.
Nope.
Just don't use Chrome. That's an even better solution.
Let me teach you a neat trick (I'll use firefox as an example, but this can be done in any browser because it's a "feature" of HTML).
>Open firefox and navigate to a login page where your password is saved
>Right click on password box and click inspect element
>In the console, change type="password" to type=""
>Move your eyes back to the password field
Oh dear, what's this?!
Protip: Don't store your passwords in your browsers if you let other people use your computer. End of story.
In Firefox you can go to preferences, security, and saved passwords. And News Flash: If you leave your wallet unattended for 30 seconds, someone could take your money. I guess wallet makers should include a warning too?
Incorrect if you set a master password, which Firefox allows you to do and is the reason why everyone's saying 'wtf, chrome?' and leaving firefox alone.
As for the dumb ones, they're storing their passwords on a sticky-post. Or using Chrome.
Also, just because some people will be able to access the passwords with physical access doesn't mean it's not worth doing basic/unsecure locking. I'd rather use a system where people need to have the know how to use keyloggers in order to break, over one where Joe Schmoe can walk in and take everything.
In the end I have always known the security issues with saving passwords so I don't save any banking passwords or email account passwords in any browser.
And what's a better way to make it clear than actually showing the passwords ?
Read this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_astonishmen...
Then tell me what's better:
- Asking users to store password, and having a menu hidden in the guts of Chrome's settings that most users will never look at.
OR
- Asking users to store password, and prompting them at the same time that doing so is insecure.
Keeping in mind that the vast majority of users of this software are average, non-techies.
After all, google's business model depends directly on how much private information is shared over much of the internet.
2) Either the browser demands an unlock password every single time it queries the password store--which is probably not an acceptable experience for most users--or the browser can arbitrarily read the password store when left unattended. There's no meaningful middle ground here. An option to demand a credential before unlocking the store might be nice for nerds, but nerds don't need it anyway, because they can use 1Password (or similar) to do this for them. It's simply not tenable for normals. Good grief, just look at the wailing and moaning that the UAC prompts in Windows Vista generated. Those prompts by default didn't even demand credentials, just a click through.
But this is EXACTLY Justin's point: EVEN with a master password, they'd be accessible in other ways by anyone using his computer, because it's just stored in the keychain - and if they add a master password, people will think that makes it more secure.
The solution here is to remove the show button - don't add any kind of master password - because that's just snake oil.
Maybe (there are simple but very effective prevention methods against keyloggers etc.), but the main point is: it's not all black and white. There are varying levels of security (and varying levels of "hacker skills"). Passwords encrypted with a master password are at least a couple of levels safer than those displayed in plain text.
The more interesting argument here is the "crime of convenience" - where someone didn't want the passwords, but just saw them laying around in plain sight. But that isn't actually the case in Chrome: it's like four clicks. You have to actually be trying to find them.
Not to mention this doesn't seem to be an oversight by the Chrome team - it seems this is 'as designed'.
Why are you more concerned about something he has to go digging through settings purposely to find, than something he is almost guaranteed to stumble across?
Your software allows me to open up one application and see all passwords. It's likely the single most-used application, and the easiest attack vector on the machine. If I wanted your password, I'd try Chrome first. It's very widely-used, and therefore a huge vector. That is the problem here.
Either change it, or better communicate the need to lock your system. Because to an average user on the street, this is a scary thing to be able to do so easily.
Is there a public point of contact that I can speak to about this?