It's much more likely "AES minor vulns found" happens over a period of years; the push to change algorithms happens somewhat more reasonably like most security patches. Taking a year to get rid of MD5, DES, SHA1, etc. through protocol version upgrades isn't any worse than 5-10 (and counting) we got by allowing pluggability.
In the SaaS, browser, and mobile client world, upgrading software and upgrading configs aren't that different in pain, in practice.
Getting rid of MD5, DES, and SHA1 is easy with pluggable algorithms. Just remove those ciphersuites from the ssl implementations.
The reason it's a pain in the ass to get rid of those old ciphers and hashes is not that the algorithms are pluggable, it's that nobody wants to force everyone else to upgrade (and force other ssl implementations to implement enough new ciphersuites that the old ones can be removed), right?
How is that better than having pluggable ciphers?
I don't really understand the combining of symmetric, asymmetric, and hash under one ciphersuite id namespace either. It's like the SSL/TLS authors had never encountered the DRY concept before. It makes adding or removing a cipher or hash into a tedious exercise, getting particular combinations into RFCs.