Maybe this would make more sense if you could describe what was madness-making about cipher negotiation.
JCE implementation (mostly related to scope, era, etc.) -- admittedly, we only needed a non-US JCE for a few specific things, as part of an overcomplicated financial transfer system.
PGP/OpenPGP; there were lots of reasons this sucked, but multiple ciphersuites didn't help at all.
Free S/WAN was painful too (and really most of IPsec), but it's an example of the higher level problem of "too many layers of indirection and abstraction", not "too many algorithm choices."
(Poking at OpenSSL internals as a consumer of the library and trying to get it to work with some hardware shit made me mostly want to die, too, but part of that is my inferior C skills, and other things specific to OpenSSL and not to the overall concept of multiple algorithms)
OTR, ecash protocols of various types, etc. which used hardcoded algorithms were comparatively painless.
ssh is probably a good counterexample -- relatively flexible choices, although the big shift from v1 to v2 fixed a lot more things than just algorithms.
What can I do to protect myself? Do you forsee projects like these responding to the concerns in the presentation in a timely manner?
How is that better than having pluggable ciphers?
I don't really understand the combining of symmetric, asymmetric, and hash under one ciphersuite id namespace either. It's like the SSL/TLS authors had never encountered the DRY concept before. It makes adding or removing a cipher or hash into a tedious exercise, getting particular combinations into RFCs.
It's much more likely "AES minor vulns found" happens over a period of years; the push to change algorithms happens somewhat more reasonably like most security patches. Taking a year to get rid of MD5, DES, SHA1, etc. through protocol version upgrades isn't any worse than 5-10 (and counting) we got by allowing pluggability.
In the SaaS, browser, and mobile client world, upgrading software and upgrading configs aren't that different in pain, in practice.
Getting rid of MD5, DES, and SHA1 is easy with pluggable algorithms. Just remove those ciphersuites from the ssl implementations.
The reason it's a pain in the ass to get rid of those old ciphers and hashes is not that the algorithms are pluggable, it's that nobody wants to force everyone else to upgrade (and force other ssl implementations to implement enough new ciphersuites that the old ones can be removed), right?
IMO the best way to do all of this is to have one (set of) algorithm per major version of protocol. It's fine to change that (by adding new protocol handling) going forward, and potentially to deprecate old versions too, but cipher negotiation/etc. is otherwise madness-making. That, and shitty encodings, are most of the pain I have when working with stuff.
(The issue raised here of "ECC should be more widely used" is good, though -- I've been looking at blinded ECC algorithms recently.)