Re:New attack plucks secrets from HTTPS-protected pages
by phlo on Friday August 02, 2013 @05:36AM
(#6146116)
What about deterministic padding? As a (badly thought through) example: Hash the plaintext, then use the first couple of bits of that result as your padding size.
This should counteract averaging of requests. On the other hand, an attacker might work around this by adding a unique token in addition to their guess...
Re:New attack plucks secrets from HTTPS-protected pages
by peterwwillis on Thursday August 01, 2013 @03:36PM
(#6142899)
Yeah, the important part is to randomize the output itself, in addition to padding. Even without the padding it makes for a significant challenge to determine just where your known plaintext is to compare from. But with enough attempts, if deflate eventually succeeds in shortening a message on a successful match, you could eventually find the matching message. Like you say, probably too long to be effective (depending on the number of random permutations and the size of the secret)
It would certainly increase the number of requests necessary to a quantity that (for the vast majority of cases) would be well above any sane usage, and couple easily be rate limited.
Credit where it's due, StavrosK and I were discussing this earlier, and averaging out the noise was his idea.