Re:How HTTPS Stops Attackers: What Every Web Dev Should Know
by sehrope on Thursday July 25, 2013 @02:16AM
(#6101169)
> But not for proxying HTTPS requests to actual users.
Proxying everything, including HTTPS traffic, is not uncommon for internal proxies at corporations.
Since they control the desktop infrastructure a lot of companies install an internal CA as trusted root. This trusted root can then masquerade as any website it wants since it can sign any certificate it generates on the fly. As a regular user you wouldn't even notice unless you are certificate pinning.
The other big use for internal CAs is being able to issue SSL certs for internal apps without having to have them signed externally (both the inconvenience and $$$ involved).
Re:How HTTPS Stops Attackers: What Every Web Dev Should Know
by pampa on Thursday July 25, 2013 @06:41AM
(#6101763)
AND because of the inconvenience and $$$ involved a lot of applications use a self signed cert and just skip checking the validity of the CA. I have written a few apps like that myself, so I suppose it is a common pattern.
1. The client sends a CONNECT request (instead of GET) which instructs the proxy to open up a secure tunnel with the remote server. In this situation, the proxy steps out of the way and simply shuffles bits back and forth, as if it were just another router between networks.
2. Setup a "Man in the Middle Proxy" which creates/signs certificates for each site on the fly. Basically, the client thinks the proxy is the server, and the server thinks the proxy is the client. The only way this works though, is if the browser is instructed to trust certificates signed by the MitM proxy. So this works fine if you're setting up a proxy on your local dev machine, for example. But not for proxying HTTPS requests to actual users.