He contends that 90% of the conversation between the pilots was conducted in English and then, a bit later, quotes a multi-line dialogue between the captain and first officer that was completely in Korean and which he had to translate.
In making the case that the rigidly hierarchical nature of Korean society wasn't a factor in a crash, he describes multiple, conflicting axes-of-respect (age, experience, training) that would've existed and weighed on the crew members' thoughts and actions.
At another point, he seems to be saying that an airline isn't accident-prone if some (not all) of its crashed/destroyed planes were downed because the crew flew them off course and into hostile territory. How many other passenger planes were downed by the Soviets during the same period? Apparently none: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airliner_shootdown_inci...
I'm no fan of Gladwell and the "Igon Value" fiasco should have clued people into the fact that they should be wary of science popularizers, but even a stopped clock is right twice a day. Especially if it's just repeating aspects of what other clocks have been saying.
Anyway, the OP's intent is to show that in these Korean passages, Gladwell apparently cherry-picks and edits the otherwise innocuous dialogue in a misleading way:
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There is the sound of a man shifting in his seat. A minute passes. 0121:13 CAPTAIN: Eh... really... sleepy. [unintelligible words]. FIRST OFFICER: Of course. Then comes one of the most critical moments in the flight. The first officer decides to speak up: FIRST OFFICER: Don't you think it rains more? In this area, here? The first officer must have thought long and hard before making that comment . . . [W]hen the first officer says: "Don't you think it rains more? In this area, here?" we know what he means by that: Captain. You have committed us to visual approach, with no backup plan, and the weather outside is terrible. You think we will break out of the clouds in time to see the runway. But what if we don't? It's pitch-black outside and pouring rain and the glide scope is down. There is no nice way of saying this: this portion of Gladwell's writing is ridiculous in several ways.
First, the way in which Gladwell quoted the transcript is severely misleading. This is the full transcript, which goes from pp. 185 to 187 of the NTSB report: CAPTAIN: 어... 정말로... 졸려서... (불분명) [eh... really... sleepy... (unintelligible words)] FIRST OFFICER: 그럼요 [Of course] FIRST OFFICER: 괌이 안 좋네요 기장님 [Captain, Guam condition is no good]FIRST OFFICER: Two nine eighty-six CAPTAIN: 야! 비가 많이 온다 [Uh, it rains a lot]CAPTAIN: (unintelligible words) CAPTAIN: 가다가 이쯤에서 한 20 마일 요청해 [Request twenty miles deviation later on] FIRST OFFICER: 네 [yes] CAPTAIN: ... 내려가면서 좌측으로 [... to the left as we are descending] (UNCLEAR SPEAKER): (chuckling, unintelligible words) FIRST OFFICER: 더 오는 것같죠? 이 안에. [Don't you think it rains more? In this area, here?] (emphases mine)
Note the difference between the full transcript, and the way Gladwell presented the transcript. Gladwell only quoted the first two lines and the last line of this sequence, omitting many critical lines in the process. In doing so, Gladwell wants to create an impression that the first officer underwent some period of silent contemplation, and decided to warn the captain of the poor weather conditions in an indirect, suggestive manner.
The full transcript reveals that this is clearly not the case. The first officer spoke up directly, clearly, and unmistakably: "Captain, Guam condition is no good." It is difficult to imagine how a person could be more direct about the poor weather condition. Further, there was no silent contemplation by the first officer. Nearly three minutes elapse during this sequence, during the captain and the first officer chatted constantly. And it is the captain who first brings up the fact that it is raining a great deal: "Uh, it rains a lot." In this context, it is clear that the first officer is engaged in some friendly banter about the rain, not some indirect, ominous warning about the flight conditions.
edit: Here's a key rebuttal:
> "Gladwell also notes that Korean manner of speaking is indirect and suggestive, requiring the listener to be engaged and applying proper context to understand the true meaning...And the transcript reveals a striking fact that Gladwell never mentions: 90 percent of the conversation among the three pilots is in English. In fact, the only part of the conversation that happens in Korea is idle banter, talking about how the company does not pay them enough or how Guam's airport must be staffed by former U.S. soldiers who were stationed in Korea."
If the premise of Malcolm's chapter is how culture/ethnicity can be related to operational catastrophes, particularly in language, then the power of the assertion is significantly undermined if language wasn't much of a factor in the actual incident.