It could be an artifact of my postfix configuration. Looking over a few logfiles, here are the ciphers I've seen recently (all servers, not just gmail):

ADH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits) AES128-SHA (128/128 bits) AES256-SHA (256/256 bits) DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits) EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA (168/168 bits) RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)

Curiously, I'm seeing a bunch of TLSv1:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:256 between one of my machines and google...

I wonder why/when the connections end up RC4-SHA instead?

Google serves up static content uses DHE. We've noticed only Google sites using DSA certs with ECDHE. A report on what we found http://trisul.org/blog/dsa-xdrill/post.html

> Hmmm, no Perfect Forward Secrecy on RC4-SHA...

Actually dont see how you can have PFS on DHE either if one of the endpoints doesnt co-operate. You can simply dump the master keys and provide those to the decrypting app.

Or just dump the plaintext data.

If I tell you a secret, and you tell someone else ... there's not a lot I can do a about that. If you don't want a third party to be able to hand over your plaintext (or store it) -- don't give them your plaintext (or a means to access your plaintext).

Similarly, if I send you a PGP encrypted email, I can't know if you decrypt that and hand it over to someone else (willingly or unwittingly).

I can though, still assume that if I send you a GPG encrypted email to your gmail account - I've only got to worry about _you_ leaking the contents, not Google.

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

hQIMA13LrXtLThhwAQ/+LmYMzmaQ3Ui0AF5yRKzCVL/rXzUO3h+cKZVnA2AL/SAR PHcVjgGkm4BT3C8pokeTl+UQPqsBj/i3gteC0zi5QTMyXYxnkCC6915yVGON86BS E5i+pEpXIubnWiKZh81Ik+YARYnTqi+Ea5zW0OAzKmd48FX9m21MK0fKHcdjoYZk 56JaMbTgcSTcW2RIztwQr9EeTnf/XIHsIrhQuOGmZd9kTmbxn9mA+W2AKzgPmv7s Z+RUgEMrbyjNK+s2V/ibPE0CDpBKR6cleWRmAgEknu2Z8QaBIgiv+a64mKMbtL6I H8ZCcM1djgBmXvjfHRwJEvEKEIfJKVQ5Q1SMyskAkWt23CQIbd1toLzx/2e0F0O3 Zjppm+qnBhM6JUOnuc5L42uvZK1+0L3aT99UX5L2xOV8OdqgVto1u+d/Q35LUhNl jjslEKidDxhxFWVHJvVhY/4ogQZIq4WrEpDMoYjRzniECMi779MTl6UnX0vRjVuw 3dbXppozqhB40P7q9Om+ORXGfMrzpIRwABltY6NI5PPjeFgHeNZ/gAFxfWn6INYa mielp57irCYBAVaVIodds2EZNSJ3o8m8A/p4HKbuS8W1qDkU2QY4k+Ns27LY3EQM 0fXx6Ug5INql6vHQpj02W4q4S8A0FipS70WZIH4eWm/aLDWV4PT/0hMoGAhYPgvS lgFoQeoAPeaPJ+Tlb1WX5V7cePBH3EZte+0WcBwlZBBejCBNVAjpyFUG4jMcOv/B IPPa+7IFWjE/1kf7n6e+/OsqDjXWem2j5wJd8R0SJlJk97/VjGDvYAn2mdNCqQ43 /sLRy5oTgEE+kljtFriL5Qfdhkei5UR8RZxV3Yv3J+ARohj7JJovSi0psR9hVI5J BGL2emenig== =Eqf+ -----END PGP MESSAGE-----

Oh, absolutely. I just wanted to point out that if you're communicating with google, you're communicating with google -- so even if they enable perfect forward secrecy over smtp/tls -- that's not a 100% fix.

It is still better than them not enabling it -- because if we can assume they do not log the data by default, on their own (aka: we can trust google) -- old data won't be accessible once a (theoretical) new warrant arrives.