Forward Secrecy only garanties that given the master keys Eve still can't derive the session key. It says nothing about the scheme used to create the session key (which may not be safe) It only states that even if Eve gets the private key that won't give her any information on the session key. It's the "won't leek any information" part that makes it "Perfect".
"Prefect" is used in the same way in "Perfect Information-Theorical Security" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_security) were the Info-Theoric Security is perfect if the cipher text doesn't leek any information about the plain text.
The use of the word perfect seems consistent to me. The problem is actually understanding what we are talking about and what part of it is Perfect.
"Forward secrecy" is an accurate term. "Perfect" is redundant and potentially misleading.
The link you've provided doesn't implicate Diffie Hellman; it's in an obscure, virtually unused NIST standard that uses elliptic curves to generate random numbers.
There are other things not to like about the NIST curves, but the methodology used to generate them is documented (I suppose you could generate your own using the same method) and is based on the literature on ECC from the late '90s.