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Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jgrahamc on Monday June 24, 2013 @02:54PM (#5934894)
I really hate the name "Perfect Forward Secrecy". There's no guarantee in ECDHE that the connections cannot be decrypted at some future time. All that's being implied is that the key changes per connection.

Sure, it's 'better' than RSA with a long lived private key, but there could be advances that would breach ECDH and make none of this 'perfect'. Such as: http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securityma... If the NIST supplied curves used by the TLS standard had a backdoor none of this would be perfect.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:09PM (#5934973)
What you hate is the word "perfect". "Forward secrecy", though, has a technical meaning: a compromise in the long-lived key material for the cryptosystem doesn't enable an adversary to go back and decrypt earlier saved sessions.

The link you've provided doesn't implicate Diffie Hellman; it's in an obscure, virtually unused NIST standard that uses elliptic curves to generate random numbers.

There are other things not to like about the NIST curves, but the methodology used to generate them is documented (I suppose you could generate your own using the same method) and is based on the literature on ECC from the late '90s.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by jgrahamc on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:19PM (#5935050)
Yes, it's the word 'perfect' that really bothers me. I think it gives the general public the wrong impression.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by roc on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:40PM (#5935173)
Perhaps they should call it "pretty good"?
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by tptacek on Monday June 24, 2013 @03:52PM (#5935244)
I just call it "forward secrecy". I think "complete" would be a better word than "perfect", but I think that neither are necessary.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by damarquis on Monday June 24, 2013 @07:37PM (#5936460)
Cryptographers seem to have a thing for misleading names. A big one is "provable security" which really means "is at least as hard as another more old and famous problem that we are all guessing is hard to solve efficiently." In any case "provable security" alone is often too difficult to prove so more assumptions are added to make the proof go through. Saying you've obtained provable security under some assumptions doesn't sound very good though, so the assumptions are called "models" instead.
Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by lke on Tuesday June 25, 2013 @04:21AM (#5938176)
Maybe i'm reading it wrong but I have the impression that the problem here is the notion of forward secrecy.

Forward Secrecy only garanties that given the master keys Eve still can't derive the session key. It says nothing about the scheme used to create the session key (which may not be safe) It only states that even if Eve gets the private key that won't give her any information on the session key. It's the "won't leek any information" part that makes it "Perfect".

"Prefect" is used in the same way in "Perfect Information-Theorical Security" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_security) were the Info-Theoric Security is perfect if the cipher text doesn't leek any information about the plain text.

The use of the word perfect seems consistent to me. The problem is actually understanding what we are talking about and what part of it is Perfect.

Re:Perfect Forward Secrecy can block the NSA, but almost no ... by dlitz on Wednesday June 26, 2013 @04:13AM (#5944759)
So, the actual scheme is authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement. Its security is based on the discrete logarithm problem---it does not provide perfect information-theoretical security.

"Forward secrecy" is an accurate term. "Perfect" is redundant and potentially misleading.