More to the point - I want the expectation of privacy and the deployment of tools to maintain privacy in the face of technological and legal "advances" in surveillance to seem closer to "technologically informed libertarian" rather than "paranoid wingnut" or "jetliner-hijacking 3rd-world-sympathiser".
"A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong adversary. Instead, we assume an adversary who can observe some fraction of network traffic; who can generate, modify, delete, or delay traffic; who can operate onion routers of his own; and who can compromise some fraction of the onion routers."[1]
If your attacker is not "a global passive adversary"(GPA) what dots are they going to connect if you renew your car registration? If your attacker is a GPA they are already connecting all the dots.
[1] https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-des...
I'm assuming "they" have access to government servers and networks, and that they'll easily be able to connect me - as a real and (at least mostly) law abiding citizen - to a clean-slate browser using SSL over TOR - logging in to a government web server with real world credentials and doing some mundane and law abiding everyday task.
Which may well be true.
(But I'm still hoping my new 2048bit GPG key and a significant portion of tor nodes are _not_ NSA bugged...)
However, that doesn't mean there isn't a good reason to use it anyway to make a statement and promote legitimate usage of Tor.