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Re:DNSCrypt: A tool for securing communications between a cl... by tptacek on Wednesday June 19, 2013 @03:22PM (#5907621)
I meant that DNS spoofing vulnerabilities that are currently impractical against unencrypted DNS might not always be impractical against unencrypted DNS.

In the recent discussions about NSA surveillance, a technological anchor we could repeatedly point to was the fact that Google baked the identities of their keys directly into the binaries for Google Chrome. Firefox has adopted the same approach. I don't think it's hyperventilation to suggest that NSA has at least one trusted CA key in its possession, but despite that, NSA probably can't invisibly MITM Google Mail sessions because Chrome's trust anchor for Google Mail isn't a CA certificate.

In a DNSSEC world where DANE was used for key pinning, we'd be back to trusting a PKI root. Moreover, the PKI root we'd most often be trusting is one controlled by the US Government. How, exactly, is that a step forward?

Re:DNSCrypt: A tool for securing communications between a cl... by dfc on Wednesday June 19, 2013 @03:47PM (#5907735)
step forward

Duh, thank you. I don't know why I was approaching it as if the clients had the DNSSEC keys hardcoded for each zone. It seems that there is not a lot of hope for a solution that is easily interoperable (BYO Browser/MTA) when your threat model includes nation state and sub-nation state threats.

Re:DNSCrypt: A tool for securing communications between a cl... by tptacek on Wednesday June 19, 2013 @03:56PM (#5907784)
This is what's good about DNSCurve; it provides value immediately and deploys incrementally without boiling the ocean, and it doesn't come with a whole new PKI that would (for instance) force every .LY app to trust the government of Libya.