News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by evadne on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:33AM (#5891905)
> For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read them. Apple cannot decrypt that data.

I don’t know, then, why when I do an iCloud restore on a brand new device, all existing messages are recovered. Is this a way to recover all past messages that’s not really addressed, if I can still recover all historical messages after replacing all devices connected to an iCloud account at once?

Cursory links:

http://security.blogoverflow.com/2012/09/qotw-34-imessage-wh...

https://github.com/meeee/pushproxy

http://imfreedom.org/wiki/IMessage

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by ParkerK on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:54AM (#5891967)
>why when I do an iCloud restore on a brand new device, all existing messages are recovered

Because they're stored locally on your phone, and then encrypted as a backup file. The statement is saying that the messages aren't sent in the open, so no one (including Apple) can eavesdrop. Of course you can get them from your backup, if you have access to a password, you can always access encrypted data with it.

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by atirip on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:42AM (#5891926)
Hmm, if they are encrypted with your password and Apple does only store hash of that password for login and encrupted messages then everything is ok? I assume that when you change your iCloud password, the old messages are not visible anymore. Anybody to verify that?
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by nknighthb on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:06AM (#5892001)
> I assume that when you change your iCloud password, the old messages are not visible anymore.

I'm not sure why that would be true.

I posit that such a system could work like this:

* An asymmetric keypair (e.g. RSA or ECC) is generated and stored on Apple's servers. The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form.

* When a device is added, the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device.

* When your password is changed, either A) the private key is decrypted with the original password, and re-encrypted with the new password, or B) the private key is decrypted, used to decrypt all data, thrown away, and a new keypair is generated, with which all data is then re-encrypted.

It is, of course, obvious that Apple could, in theory, capture your plaintext password somewhere in there and use it to decrypt messages.

There are ways around this, such as devices doing the key decryption locally and only ever sending a derived/hashed form of your password to the server, and using a different derived/hashed form for encryption.

However, since you can log in to iCloud and Apple's store with your Apple ID in a browser, there is still no effective defense against Apple capturing your plaintext password (unless you care to perform a detailed inspection of a bunch of JavaScript every single time you load any content from Apple's servers).

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by atirip on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:38AM (#5892101)
But this is totally different thing. One is what some company stores by their IT design and then what some agency can require of that data. Second is whether some agency can force/ask some company to do more, to do active spying by that agency spec. So for example, if company X does not log locations, can NSA force them to start doing that? What else can NSA by law force private company X to do? Can they for example force CEO to stalk user Y by foot? If they can not do that, how can they force to develop IT-systems to do that? So when NSA ask to turn location tracking on, and company Y refuses, then what? CEO goes to jail?
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by nknighthb on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:41AM (#5892106)
Yes, I was responding to what your first comment said, which is, indeed, entirely unrelated to what you've now brought up.

Did your first comment not say what you meant?

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by atirip on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:54AM (#5892133)
Did, did, i just responded to your (and some other respondents) remarks that Apple _could_ do something they said they are not doing (like catching plain passwords). The fact is when company really-really wants to stalk you, they can.
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by ninjay on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:33AM (#5892085)
> The private key is encrypted with the user's password, which is not retained by Apple except in a hashed form.

> the private key is decrypted using the password and sent to the device.

wait, where is this private key coming from then? your other devices?

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by nknighthb on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:36AM (#5892095)
Either Apple would generate it server-side, or the first device to "sign up" would generate it.

Remember, I'm only explaining a hypothetical method by which the Apple system could work, consistent with Apple's statements and behavior I've observed from my iPhones, iPads, and Macs. It's not an explanation of a strictly secure system.

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by ninjay on Monday June 17, 2013 @05:21AM (#5892178)
> would generate it.

where is it stored though?

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by rdouble on Monday June 17, 2013 @05:26AM (#5892190)
in the Keychain
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by ninjay on Monday June 17, 2013 @06:33AM (#5892369)
sigh
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by nknighthb on Monday June 17, 2013 @08:15AM (#5892698)
Did you fundamentally misinterpret my sentence? The password is not retained by Apple, the private key is retained, in encrypted form.
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by __alexs on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:57AM (#5891980)
Given that you send your password in platin text to Apple whenever you login this does not seem like a particularly interception resistant protocol. Apple just need to wait until you login again and then send the encrypted data, and your password to the intelligence services?
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by morgante on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:11AM (#5892016)
Do we know that they send your password in plain text?
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by nknighthb on Monday June 17, 2013 @04:33AM (#5892087)
For all intents and purposes, they must, at least when you login via a web browser.
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by morgante on Wednesday June 19, 2013 @11:36AM (#5906121)
Not technically. You can do client-side encryption so that only the hash is sent, via Javascript.
Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by brisance on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:55AM (#5891972)
The following support document states that you get 5GB of free iCloud storage of messages in the form of iMessages, SMS and MMS.

http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4859?viewlocale=en_US&locale=e...

It doesn't state how the iCloud backup is stored however.

Re:Apple’s Commitment to Customer Privacy by comex on Monday June 17, 2013 @03:55AM (#5891976)
Of course, if you're concerned about privacy, it may be a good idea to abstain from iCloud backup/sync and not send all your notes, contacts, etc. to a remote server in the first place. iTunes backups may be relatively clumsy, but they still work.