The original implementation of Skype was convenient and secure.
It was secure if you trust a closed-source program made by a company that could be decrypting your communication because they've got your keys, or that could have put any number of backdoors in the program.
And it's secure if you don't consider the possibility of doing traffic analysis, or the fact that most people are identifiable by their IP addresses, etc.
If you lower your standards enough, I guess anything could be considered "secure".
My comment was more directed toward the fact that ephemeral keys and P2P can be secure and convenient for real-time communication.
It appears that neither the developers of Skype nor the government of Estonia viewed that as a bad trade-off.
If the encryption algorithm that's used is well respected among cryptographers and has no known, practically exploitable weaknesses; if this algorithm has been implemented correctly in the encryption software; if the software is used properly by every party involved in the communcation; if these parties' systems have not been compromised; if the people or entitites interested in your communication are not (like the NSA is speculated to be) 20 to 30 years ahead of the public cryptography community -- all very big if's -- then you might buy yourself some time until the encryption is finally broken (something that might happen tomorrow, or next month, or next year, or 20 years from now, or never, who knows?).
In the meantime, your encrypted communication could be intercepted, recorded, and stored indefinitely -- and available for a practically limitless number of decryption attempts in the future.
That said, if and when an easy-to-use, truly secure p2p communication system ever gains real traction then action against it will probably be on the table. Banning won't really work, as you say, but it can probably be made inconvenient/unpalatable enough to discourage most users.
I think most people agree that there do exist legitimate cases for governmental wiretapping, as long as the rules are agreed upon and followed strictly. Genuine untappable comms will be a threat to that legitimate government function and I don't think, barring some radical shift in popular opinion, there will be much opposition to such a ban.
The NSA had its own easy-access problem lately...Snowden reportedly snuck data out using USB drives, something that was purportedly banned after a 2008 virus incident...and yet, some sysop apparently thought it'd be a good idea to let a few USB ports survive, because the things are so damned useful. And now look at what that wrought the NSA.
It's not just inconvenience that you have to put up when going for security, it's the risk that the inconvenience will cause you to enact blind spots to ease your day...and easing inconvenience was exactly the reason why people use cloud services (and USB keys) in the first place.
I'm not trying to espouse fatalism (i.e. everyone just give up their data to the G-men). Just pointing out that what the OP wants is basically a unicorn.