The NSA had its own easy-access problem lately...Snowden reportedly snuck data out using USB drives, something that was purportedly banned after a 2008 virus incident...and yet, some sysop apparently thought it'd be a good idea to let a few USB ports survive, because the things are so damned useful. And now look at what that wrought the NSA.
It's not just inconvenience that you have to put up when going for security, it's the risk that the inconvenience will cause you to enact blind spots to ease your day...and easing inconvenience was exactly the reason why people use cloud services (and USB keys) in the first place.
I'm not trying to espouse fatalism (i.e. everyone just give up their data to the G-men). Just pointing out that what the OP wants is basically a unicorn.
The original implementation of Skype was convenient and secure.
It was secure if you trust a closed-source program made by a company that could be decrypting your communication because they've got your keys, or that could have put any number of backdoors in the program.
And it's secure if you don't consider the possibility of doing traffic analysis, or the fact that most people are identifiable by their IP addresses, etc.
If you lower your standards enough, I guess anything could be considered "secure".
My comment was more directed toward the fact that ephemeral keys and P2P can be secure and convenient for real-time communication.
It appears that neither the developers of Skype nor the government of Estonia viewed that as a bad trade-off.
If the encryption algorithm that's used is well respected among cryptographers and has no known, practically exploitable weaknesses; if this algorithm has been implemented correctly in the encryption software; if the software is used properly by every party involved in the communcation; if these parties' systems have not been compromised; if the people or entitites interested in your communication are not (like the NSA is speculated to be) 20 to 30 years ahead of the public cryptography community -- all very big if's -- then you might buy yourself some time until the encryption is finally broken (something that might happen tomorrow, or next month, or next year, or 20 years from now, or never, who knows?).
In the meantime, your encrypted communication could be intercepted, recorded, and stored indefinitely -- and available for a practically limitless number of decryption attempts in the future.
That said, if and when an easy-to-use, truly secure p2p communication system ever gains real traction then action against it will probably be on the table. Banning won't really work, as you say, but it can probably be made inconvenient/unpalatable enough to discourage most users.
I think most people agree that there do exist legitimate cases for governmental wiretapping, as long as the rules are agreed upon and followed strictly. Genuine untappable comms will be a threat to that legitimate government function and I don't think, barring some radical shift in popular opinion, there will be much opposition to such a ban.
Encypting your email and having to deal with key managment issues, and hosting your own email server is going to be more of a hassle than just using someone else's "free" cloud-based service.
Setting up and managing your own services is going to be a burden and a time sink, even if you have the skills, knowledge, and copious free time to do it all.
The question becomes: how much is your privacy and security worth to you? Unfortunately, for most people the answer is "not that much". Nevermind that most of them don't have the knowledge or skills to set up and manage their own services even if they valued their security and privacy enough to sacrifice so much time and effort to it.
The problems are magnified when you consider that most applications are not built with security, privacy, or anonymity in mind. And when you have to use these applications to interact with other people (most of which probably won't be nearly as security or privacy conscious as you are), you're going to have an uphill battle to protect your own privacy. For instance, good luck getting your computer illiterate parents, friends, colleagues, and bosses to properly use GPG to encrypt their emails to you.
This doesn't even begin to address the issues of privacy and security in the "real world" as opposed to the digital one, nor of the digital footprints you leave as you consume online information and media, and interact with others on various forums.
The end result is that online privacy and security are largely becoming the mainstay of the super-paranoid technological elite and the ultra-rich, who can afford to hire security teams to take care of their privacy for them, and of the technological outcast, who (willingly or unwillingly) manages to avoid using the net at all.