Re:NSA-proof encryption exists. Why doesn’t anyone use it?
by kniht on Friday June 14, 2013 @02:13PM
(#5881434)
AFAIK a strong key passphrase would be effective at protecting the private key while it's at rest (stolen laptop / hard drive). However as soon as the private key is pulled into memory for a signing or encryption operation the passphrase doesn't matter as the raw key is needed at that point.
As for your second question, there are techniques that perform static and dynamic analysis on javascript to try and detect illegal flows or taint propagation (without having to resort to monitoring the outbound network traffic). See [1] and [2] if you're interested in that topic.
[1] http://static.usenix.org/event/sec10/tech/full_papers/Bandha... [2] http://publik.tuwien.ac.at/files/pub-inf_5310.pdf
That said, couldn't this be mitigated by having a strong passphrase on the private key? How hard is the wrapper to attack?
Also, couldn't security researchers easily monitor the packets on this process and sound the alarm should they find that the js served up by Google or Microsoft suddenly starts sending private keys to the server?