News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by WestCoastJustin on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:50PM (#5876481)
Steve Gibson suggests [1] that direct access means, direct access to their internet pipes, effectively tapping or mirroring their content for analysis. He says that "direct access" has more meaning to non-techies than saying they "are listening at the upstream router". Very interesting podcast too. The $20 million per collection point, is to build the secure secret rooms [2] at their [google, facebook, apple, microsoft, etc] telecom providers, slip the fibers, and for all the gear they need to do it. He even suggests this is legal, since it is the open internet and anyone is allowed to peer into the traffic, since this is not actually in any of their [google, facebook, apple, microsoft, etc] data centers, but at the peering level.

[1] http://twit.tv/show/security-now/408

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by daeken on Thursday June 13, 2013 @06:04PM (#5876873)
Honestly, I have to take anything that Steve Gibson says with a massive grain of salt. Remember, this is the man who claimed that raw sockets would destroy the Internet.

Given that his suggestions are 100% speculation, I'd be willing to put any amount of money on the line that it's nonsense.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by slg on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:55PM (#5876506)
I am not a network expert, but won't most of that data still be encrypted through SSL? If that is the case, it would be almost useless since sites like Facebook and Google have made the transition to defaulting to using SSL.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by aryastark on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:38PM (#5876766)
That may be true. However, the giant elephant in the room is the Utah data center.

This is a data center designed to, supposedly, store data on the scale of a yottabyte. I only say "a" yottabyte, because to assume even slightly greater than that is sheer lunacy.

That is freaking massive. If you took all terrorist cells and all terrorist activity for the history of terrorism and terrorist activity, you would not even touch a fraction of a percent utilization. We're talking rain drops in the ocean.

There is no way the NSA is merely watching the bad guys here. The data center is a few magnitudes too large for such a task.

I would assume right now they are merely recording all data, in hopes that one day they will have technology to quickly crack encryption. However, even without knowing what is said (the content), the metadata of connections gives plenty of information on what people are doing.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tptacek on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:41PM (#5876791)
That Utah data center is literally the Internet's Area 51.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by jongraehl on Thursday June 13, 2013 @09:49PM (#5877856)
"literally" :)

and yes, agreed - analogous on so many levels - a publicly admitted places where secret government things happen, which can be invoked to give an aura of reality to conspiracy theories true and false alike.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by lawnchair_larry on Thursday June 13, 2013 @07:34PM (#5877363)
It's already been established that they redefine "collect" as a human actually viewing the data. The admit that they store roughly everything they can on everyone.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by croikle on Thursday June 13, 2013 @10:55PM (#5878021)
The yottabyte stuff is basically BS. HN user Jabbles found a possible source for that, which just says '''The target GIG supports capacities exceeding exabytes (10^18 bytes) and possibly yottabytes (10^24 bytes) of data.'''[0]

Exabytes are eminently reasonable; yottabytes are not.

[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5854587

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by eco on Thursday June 13, 2013 @07:22PM (#5877308)
A yottabyte would take 3.333×10^11 3 terabyte hard disks. A 3.5 inch hard disk has a volume of 376.77344 cm³. The NSA buildings in Bluffdale take up around 1.5 million square feet. That means just the hard discs for a yottabyte would be just a bit less than a kilometer high (901 meters). That's about a 100 meters taller than Burj Khalifa. I think it's unlikely it's designed for anything near a yottabyte.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by Amadou on Thursday June 13, 2013 @07:42PM (#5877392)
Clearly they do not yet have a yottabyte worth of data. It would be silly to build a warehousing site like that and have it be full-up with data the day it first opens for business.

I expect these sizing claims (which presumably come from some sort of government statements about the facility) are based on a timeline on the order of ten years or more. A YB in 2024 is going to take a lot less physical space than a YB in 2014.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by eco on Thursday June 13, 2013 @07:49PM (#5877431)
You'd need a 2-3 order of magnitude increase in storage density to get anywhere near reasonable. I suspect that's not going to happen in 10 years but I don't know the current and projected rates of storage density increases.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by Amadou on Thursday June 13, 2013 @09:49PM (#5877860)
Last I read, storage capacity per dollar has been increasing faster than Moore's Law over the last decade or so.

I tracked down what appears to be the origin of these yottabyte claims: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/nov/05/whos-in...

Based on that, it sounds like the yottabyte claims refer to raw, unprocessed data collected. Off the bat, I'm willing to believe in a 2 orders of magnitude decrease after data reduction techniques are applied to the raw data. My experience with data collected from telescopes was that we got about 100:1 reduction on the raw data versus what went into permanent storage.

The San Antonio site was news to me, though obviously no big secret since that book was published years ago.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tome on Thursday June 13, 2013 @06:35PM (#5877057)
Maybe they haven't filled it up yet. A quick search suggests the whole internet is on the scale of exabytes, so a yottabyte could store a million internets.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by asperous on Thursday June 13, 2013 @08:58PM (#5877727)
Well even ignoring the PRISM part and Google and all that, look on the slide again: "Collection of communications on fiber cables and infrastructure as data flows past"

We already know about Room_641A[1]

[1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Room_641A

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tptacek on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:57PM (#5876523)
Yes. Not only that, but Google and Facebook, both of whom have been tarred by the PRISM story, have gone way out of their way to make SSL/TLS more pervasive in the real world, to the point where their efforts are resulting in huge improvements to clientside software.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by Zigurd on Thursday June 13, 2013 @06:57PM (#5877172)
The problem is that cleartext can't be trusted in the cloud. The only way to really restore confidence is to enable truly private endpoint-to-endpoint secured real time and store-and-forward communication.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by marshray on Thursday June 13, 2013 @06:57PM (#5877169)
It depends on where the interception device is installed.

Most of the large-scale sites are doing SSL offloading, so one of the first things that happens is the traffic is decrypted. Often this happens in the front end load balancer.

If the set up is as the WP described:

> “collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,”

and this equipment is installed behind the SSL offload devices, it would see all the customer data in the clear.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by SGCleveland on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:29PM (#5876704)
Email, however, would not be encrypted. As Google is one of the largest cloud email providers, this could provide a lot of information for the NSA. But I'm not sure Steve Gibson was correct in his assessment. Looking at that final PowerPoint slide from the PRISM deck, it seems that upstream tapping was occurring, but also mentioned PRISM as a separate program. It could be that PRISM was a related router tapping technology or something else entirely.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by pwf on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:58PM (#5876532)
Almost useless, unless you have the keys.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tptacek on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:12PM (#5876614)
Nobody has ever presented any evidence ever that NSA has Google's SSL/TLS keys. Not only that, but Google has (a) pinned their public keys so that the browser binary itself can reject bogus- but- signed certificates, and (b) pushed heavily to enable forward secrecy in TLS, which means that even if you compromise their key, you can't decrypt sessions without being an active man in the middle.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by jemfinch on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:23PM (#5876676)
Forward secrecy proposal for those curious: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-balfanz-tls-channelid-00 .
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tptacek on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:25PM (#5876688)
That's one, but the basic mechanism --- deriving session keys from RSA-signed DH exchanges --- is old, and is simply a ciphersuite (Google deploys an ECC-version of it for performance).
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by kniht on Thursday June 13, 2013 @07:16PM (#5877274)
That proposal is for an ephemeral, per gTLD client key and an example of mutual authentication that aims to defeat _active_ attackers (MITM).

Perfect forward secrecy in TLS is a bit different in that the ephemeral diffie-hellman key exchange sets up a shared key that is protected from a _passive_ attacker that observes the TLS encrypted communication and later gets a copy of the server's public key.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by pwf on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:17PM (#5876647)
Interesting, I did not know (b). That certainly makes me feel a lot better.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by just2n on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:27PM (#5876697)
Not quite. Having someone's private SSL key doesn't necessarily let you read the contents of their SSL traffic due to forward secrecy. It does let you sign messages as if you were them, or MITM their traffic.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_Socket_Layer

For instance, on HN, Chrome is currently doing this:

    Your connection to news.ycombinator.com is encrypted with 128-bit encryption.
    
    The connection uses TLS 1.2.
    
    The connection is encrypted using AES_128_CBC, with SHA256 for message
    authentication and ECDHE_RSA as the key exchange mechanism.
Using ECDHE_RSA, my browser and HN's server will agree upon a key to use for encryption using AES128 in CBC mode. Now in order to read what the server sends me and what I send to the server, you need to break the crypto:

1. Brute force the 128 bit key. This is.. probably not going to happen?

2. Via a weakness in the AES128 algorithm or implementation, you can simplify a brute force into feasibility (AFAIK, no such attack currently exists).

3. Via a passive attack on ECDHE_RSA, you could potentially guess the shared key efficiently and decipher our communications (AFAIK, no such attack currently exists).

So it's not quite as simple as recording encrypted information and obtaining the SSL keys. You need the server to actively remember the keys used for every encrypted connection, and obtain those, too. Or MITM everything and record the unencrypted data.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by mtgx on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:21PM (#5876667)
He says that for gmail for example, it would be encrypted from Gmail to Gmail user, but not Gmail to some other users, through SMTP, because then the data leaving Google is not encrypted anymore.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by slg on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:34PM (#5876738)
SMTP is inherently insecure which is why you are not supposed to use e-mail for confidential information. But SSL will still protect almost every other Google property from Search to Hangouts.

Although your post did bring up another question that I never thought about. Does Google even "send" email when it goes from one Gmail user to another? That could theoretically all be handled internally, but it never crossed my mind that they wouldn't use SMTP.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by _delirium on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:47PM (#5876809)
SMTP can be encrypted between servers (though not end-to-end) using STARTTLS, which is getting pretty common. If the mail's being relayed with STARTTLS, you wouldn't be able to read it by tapping the wire. Instead, you'd need to get access to one of the relays, since each one decrypts the message before reencrypting it for the next hop (or you could manage to get yourself inserted as a relay).

Looking at a random email in my Gmail account from a different Gmail user, it looks like they do use SMTP, or at least they are adding headers as if it went by SMTP. But both ends of the SMTP are at the same IP address:

    X-Received: from mr.google.com ([10.229.72.135])
        by 10.229.72.135 with SMTP id m7mr3900891qcj.17.1370903118607 (num_hops = 1);
        Mon, 10 Jun 2013 15:25:18 -0700 (PDT)
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by tptacek on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:41PM (#5876788)
Mail between two Google Mail addresses does not hit the Internet in plaintext SMTP.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by skwirl on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:59PM (#5876542)
It seems that what PRISM is to some people has slipped away from what was originally reported to a world of conjecture. What you are saying is possible (although I think $20 million is way too cheap) but it does not fit in with what we have heard from the media and the tech industry. The NSA also would have had to crack the SSL encryption algorithms for this to be useful, and that revelation would eclipse by an order of magnitude anything else that has been reported thus far, in my opinion.
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by chris_mahan on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:34PM (#5876742)
If the NSA could crack SSL encryption (and why not, they are code-breakers first), or if they could simply acquire the keys (from the ssl providers, from google, from whomever), would they let you know?

If you were in their shoes, had immunity, guys with guns, and billions of dollars, would you not find the weakest link and exploit it? For saving the children from terrorists, of course.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by XorNot on Friday June 14, 2013 @12:32AM (#5878321)
If the NSA had teleportation (and why not, they engage in a lot of research and development), or if they could just make people invisible, would they let you know?
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by chris_mahan on Friday June 14, 2013 @11:56AM (#5880606)
They would definitely not let us know. OMG you are so right: they would tell us nothing!
Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by mpyne on Thursday June 13, 2013 @04:53PM (#5876496)
Was the wording on the slide "direct access to"? I remember there being a "directly from the servers", but that wording has to be interpreted in the context of what it means to someone in the intel community (like the NSA).

And I'm 80% sure that what it means in that context is that the source of the data received has no middleman. I.e. they pull Google's records straight from Google, not from a wiretap or SIGINT, just like for Facebook, PalTalk, etc.

Re:The Guardian walks back claims of direct NSA access to se... by jdp23 on Thursday June 13, 2013 @05:16PM (#5876644)
The wording was indeed "collection directly from the servers". [1]

Robert O'Harrow et. al.'s followon article from the Washington post had more details [2]

Intelligence community sources said that this description, although inaccurate from a technical perspective, matches the experience of analysts at the NSA. From their workstations anywhere in the world, government employees cleared for PRISM access may “task” the system and receive results from an Internet company without further interaction with the company’s staff....

According to a more precise description contained in a classified NSA inspector general’s report, also obtained by The Post, PRISM allows “collection managers [to send] content tasking instructions directly to equipment installed at company-controlled locations,” rather than directly to company servers. The companies cannot see the queries that are sent from the NSA to the systems installed on their premises, according to sources familiar with the PRISM process.

[1] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-server...

[2] http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-com...