Getting a root's key does not enable them to decrypt the traffic. Getting the server's SSL private key USUALLY means you can retroactively decrypt, but it is possible (though uncommon) for servers to be configured to use ephemeral keys (EDH modes) which provide perfect forward secrecy (that is, the property that the session key can't be recovered even with later compromise of the server's long-term key).
Interesting sidenote: AFAIK there are no widely-supported (TLS 1.1 or below) methods of mitigating the BEAST attack while enabling PFS - those modes are TLS 1.2+ which isn't widely spoken yet.
This is all irrelevant though. The issue is with the tech companies giving them the plaintext data themselves. No amount of transport-layer encryption helps with that.
You have to stop using US services.
A certificate is an attestation (signature) by a CA's private key that a given PUBLIC key is yours, that anyone with the CA's public key can verify.
The CSR does not contain your private key.
NONE OF THIS MATTERS. This is not about bulk-decrypting SSL, though I'm sure NSA does that when and where they can, too. This is about coordinated, automated, integrated methods of transmitting the plaintext.
Why should they bother getting a key and scraping gmail's payloads when they could just have Google give them an API? Furthermore, this method would continue working perfectly even ifwhen services switched to ephemeral key modes that provide PFS.
Also, if your platform supports it, Gmail has perfect forward secrecy meaning that even if the NSA records all HTTPS traffic to gmail and later demands Google's private key they can't decrypt any of that captured traffic.
Tor on the other hand is a problem. It has several fundamental flaws as you pointed out like by controlling some gateway nodes and a few others you can start breaking any sort of secrecy that you would get from Tor. Really the only good thing about Tor is that it's well known. I really wish Tor would just die and people would move over to something better like I2P where it's an anonymous network, not just a kludged together anonymous proxy with hidden services slapped on as an afterthought.
Since I don't seem to be understanding the associated technology as well as I thought I was, could you point me towards some relevant reading on this topic? How/Why are the current implementations of HTTPS considered to have perfect forward security?
As for subpoenaing keys: Most CAs will allow for you to generate your key pair and certificate signing request on your own hardware. You'd then submit the CSR which the CA would in turn generate a signed certificate from. The private key should never be shared with the CA. In order to eavesdrop on communications, the NSA would then need to subpoena each targeted company's key. Wide reach is easy (go for the 5-10 biggest fish), comprehensive reach nigh impossible.
[1] http://vincent.bernat.im/en/blog/2011-ssl-perfect-forward-se...
I concur with your statement that SSL isn't really secure end-to-end communication when 3rd party certificates are involved.
Convegernce i.e. refused to work with CDNs which may have different certificates for the same domain for example, which may be completly valid.
The key of public key crypto (like in RSA) was to make key management easier and independent of a 3rd party, to avoid further bloat, overhead and complexity.
This is the same for Certificate Transparency/Pinning mentioned earlier, given the details it looks very strong on paper, but the implementation will suck in r/l terms.
SSL certs require cooperation of a trusted registrar even for the biggest companies -- Google's is signed by Equifax, for example. Given what we've seen in the last few days, requesting keys from the root CAs is a no-brainer.
For Tor, a bunch of attacks are possible by owning only a small percentage of all nodes. Recently, Tor was issuing a "call for relays" due to a dwindling number of participants that was endangering the network. Considering that Tor came out of Navy research, if you don't think they have a statistically interesting number of nodes, you're crazy. If they don't, it's only because they don't think that Tor is an interesting source right now.
TL;DR: Security depends on your threat model, and while I think that Tor and HTTPS provide strong protection from run-of-the-mill attackers, I don't think that either provides meaningful security if you're worried about the NSA.